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Dear Ms Claudia Heppner & Mr Georges Kass
Re. DRAFT Scientific Opinion on the re-evaluation of aspartame
(E 951) as a food additive
Further to my telephone conversations and email exchange with Christophe Wolff
on 12th and 13th February, I am now sending you this letter as my detailed response
to the EFSA Panel’s DRAFT Scientific Opinion on the re-evaluation of aspartame
(E 951) as a food additive, which was issued on 8th January 2013.
I would be pleased to travel to EFSA in Parma to discuss the issues raised in my
response, or to meet EFSA colleagues at a suitable agreed location, such as in
Brussels.
I look forward to receiving a detailed response to these comments, especially in
the light of the failure of the January draft to address the issues raised by the
dossier of 30 documents that I delivered to EFSA in Autumn 2011, in response to
an explicit request from EFSA.
My detailed comments begin on the next page.
Yours sincerely
Erik Millstone
Professor of Science Policy
(email address: e.p.millstone@sussex.ac.uk )
Tel: +44 1273 877380
Ccs including: Kartika Liotard MEP, Corinne Le Page MEP, Ms Sue Davies
Which & EFSA Board; Alisdair Wotherspoon UK FSA; Jan Marco Mueller
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Executive summary
The draft report on the safety of aspartame, issued by the European Food Safety
Authority’s ANS panel on 8 January 2013, is deeply flawed.
There are at least two main types of flaws: those arising from the criteria by which
‘evidence’ has been selected, and those arising from the criteria by which those
studies are interpreted.
The criteria of inclusion have been overly narrow, and have in particular excluded
vital documents that bear directly on the scientific competence with which some
pivotal studies were conducting and on the accuracy with which they were
reported. Such documentary evidence is directly relevant to the reliability of the
reported data, and on the truth of the claims based on those studies.
The implicit criteria of interpretation of the studies that have been included are
perverse and biased. The panel could only have reached its conclusion that
aspartame is safe by implicitly assuming that almost all studies indicating no
adverse effects are entirely reliable, even though they have numerous weaknesses
and were almost all commercially funded, while all the studies indicating that
aspartame may be unsafe are deemed unreliable, even though they sometimes have
particular methodological strengths and even though they have all been funded
independently of vested commercial interests.
On each of the 80 occasions when the panel discusses a study that indicated no
apparent risks from aspartame those studies are taken at face value and typically
assumed to be reliable. However, on each of the 27 occasions when the panel
discusses studies that indicate that aspartame may pose risks, the panel is
unremittingly critical of them, implicitly assuming that they must be misleading,
so dismissing them. Often those worrying studies are dismissed not because of
evidence but on flimsy grounds, for example by invoking speculative hypotheses
without supporting evidence.
The panel reached its conclusion that aspartame is safe not by applying uniformly
critical standards to all the evidence from all studies, but by routinely forgiving the
shortcomings of favourable studies yet being unremitting critical of all the studies
suggesting any possible risks. The panel’s overall conclusions is driven more by
the panel’s biased assumptions than by the evidence adduced.
One possible explanation for the asymmetric bias in the interpretation of studies
might be found in the pattern of conflicts of interest that characterise the members
of the panel. Of the 17 members of the EFSA panel, 7 have direct commercial
3conflicts of interest, and another 5 have institutional conflicts of interest – for
example because their employers have already announced that aspartame is safe.
Only 4 panel members are not characterised by some relevant conflicts of interest.
EFSA should therefore discount the draft report, convene a new panel composed
only of, and supported only by, experts who are free of any conflicts of interest.
They should be asked to review all the evidence, not just some of it. They should
also make explicit their criteria of interpretation, and then show that those criteria
have been consistently applied, and they should be applied to prioritises the
protection of consumer and public health over commercial or industrial
considerations. The European Commission and the European Parliament should
also take responsibility for ensuring that EFSA acts properly to protect consumers
rather than assisting the food and chemical industries.
4EFSA on Aspartame January 2013
a lost, but not the last, opportunity
Introduction
The EFSA website http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/consultations/call/130108.htm
asserts that the:
…EFSA’s Panel on Food Additives and Nutrient Sources added to
Food (ANS) has launched an open consultation on a draft opinion on
the re-evaluation of aspartame (E951). This document is the first full
evaluation of aspartame that has been requested of EFSA. The ANS
Panel has taken all available information including new human safety
data into consideration, and the draft opinion addresses the potential
safety concerns related to toxicity carcinogenicity and genotoxicity as
well as possible reproductive and developmental effects related to
aspartame and its metabolites and breakdown products.
The claim that all available information has been taken into considerations is
seriously misleading. Evidence that available and directly relevant information
has not been taken into consideration is provided by the dossier of documents that
I delivered to EFSA in the autumn of 2011.
The ANS Panel’s criteria of inclusion of relevant evidence
I responded to EFSA’s initial call, on 1 June 2011, for data on Aspartame with an
annotated list of 30 documents on 26 July 2011. I selected those documents from
my extensive collection of material on the aspartame saga because I judge them to
be indispensable for any competent, adequate and robust assessment of the safety
of aspartame. In that submission I explained that the documents comprising my
dossier indicate that:
1. when aspartame was initially tested by, and for, G D Searle in the 1970s,
several of the pivotal tests were incompetently conducted and misleadingly
reported. Furthermore, when a senior US FDA toxicologist uncovered the
problems, and they were then investigated by FDA task forces, further
evidence emerged indicating that no reliance could be placed on the
supposed results of those test.
2. The dossier of 30 documents reveals that in response Searle, and then
Nutrasweet, went to considerable lengths to conceal, or down-play the
significance of, those short-comings in the testing and reporting. Those
tactics have however not obliterated evidence, even though the ANS panel
failed top engage with it.
5EFSA replied to my letter of 1st June on 14th October 2011, requesting electronic
copies of most of the documents listed in my dossier. As the dossier was too large
to be sent by email, at 38 Mbs, I burned it onto a CD-Rom and dispatched it to
EFSA. I received email confirmation of its arrival on 4th November 2011 from a
Senior Administrative Assistant, EFSA ANS Panel.
The ANS panel only refers to 4 of the 30 documents of which my dossier was
composed, and even then it fails to addresses their clearest implications. The panel
does comment on the studies conducted by the Ramazzini Foundation (cf Item 28)
and a document referred to in my dossier as Item 15, and as the UAREP report,
where that abbreviation stands for Universities Association for Research and
Evaluation in Pathology – which is referred to by the EFSA Panel as ‘the
authentication review of selected materials submitted to the Food and Drug
Administration’ – and on page 145 as E102a, E102b and E102c . Otherwise the
EFSA Panel fails to refer to, or take any account of, my dossier or the documents
of which it is comprised. A list of the documents comprising my dossier of July
2011 is provided in Appendix 1.
Curiously the ANS panel’s draft states: “The Panel was not provided with a newly
submitted dossier and based its evaluation on previous evaluations, additional
literature that became available between then and the end of November 2012 and
the data submitted following a public call for data.” (page 3 lines 42-44) That text
suggests that the panel only counted documents submitted by the companies that
manufacture aspartame as constituting a ‘dossier’, while discounting or ignoring
the dossier that I provided. Even though the documents comprising my dossier
entail that no reliance can be placed on the results of at least 15 studies, all of
which have been accepted for and reviewed by the ANS panel.
While the documents in my dossier are not themselves reports of laboratory
experiments, they frequently refer directly to reports of laboratory experiments,
and are directly relevant to the truth of claims about those studies that purport to
be scientific. The document in my dossier also provide show that considerable
efforts were invested by G D Searle and others into covering-up evidence of the
failings of the original 15+ studies.
The EFSA website at http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/consultations/call/130108.htm
claims that the draft has included ‘scientific’ data, but it fails to clarify where it
draws the scope and limits of that term.
The panel’s draft states (page 14 lines 506-512):
“The Panel was not provided with a newly submitted dossier and
based its evaluation on previous evaluations, additional literature that
became available between then and the end of November 2012 and
the data submitted following a public call for data. The selection
criteria for scientific data consideration for the re-evaluation of
aspartame described in this opinion applied to both the existing
6published and unpublished scientific literature. These criteria were
agreed at the 28th Scientific Panel on Food Additives and Nutrient
Sources added to Food (ANS) Plenary meeting on 25-27 October
2011 and were published with the minutes of that meeting. These
criteria are reproduced in Annex A.”
The text of the panel’s Appendix A states:
__________________________________________________________________
SELECTION CRITERIA FOR SCIENTIFIC DATA CONSIDERATION
FOR THE RE-EVALUATION OF ASPARTAME
The selection criteria for scientific data consideration for the re-evaluation of
aspartame described in this report will be applied to the existing published and
unpublished scientific literature. The literature database will include scientific peer
reviewed papers and relevant non-peer reviewed papers (such as technical reports
and published conference proceedings) identified through exhaustive literature
searches performed using commercial databases and providers (e.g. ISI Web of
Knowledge, PubMed), available from previous evaluations by EFSA and SCF or
obtained as a result or EFSA’s recent public call for scientific data on aspartame
(closure: 30 September 2011).
Types of studies that will be considered within the criteria for inclusion in the
selection process.
a) Experimental studies
b) Epidemiological studies in humans
c) Case reports supported by medical evidence
Table 1: Source and Type of information available that may fall in these
categories:
Peer-reviewed Not peer-reviewed
Published papers Unpublished study reports
Meeting abstracts (conference
proceedings)
Papers in non-peer reviewed journals
or non-peer reviewed e-papers
Published case reports Meeting abstracts
Case reports in non-peer reviewed
journals
Tiered Approach for the Selection Process
Tier 1. Criteria to be used for the inclusion of scientific papers and reports in the
selection process:
1. All studies provided by the applicants (including unpublished study
reports non peer reviewed) with the original application dossier.
2. All studies on the safety and use of aspartame commissioned by national
authorities.
73. Papers and reports that have been subject to an independent scientific
peer-review process (i.e. process that scientific journals use to ensure that
the articles to be published represent the best scholarship available in terms
of solid scientific soundness and quality control) and have been
subsequently published in a scientific journal.
4. For non independently peer reviewed papers and reports assessment
based on the quality control procedures applied and the study designs used
with reference to validated standards (e.g. OECD protocols and GLP
Guidelines).
Tier 2. Criteria to be used for the rejection of papers and reports in the selection
process:
1. Insufficient details provided on the performance or outcome of the
studies (EFSA, 2009).
2. Insufficient information to assess the methodological quality of the
studies (EFSA, 2009).
References
EFSA, 2009. Guidance of the Scientific Committee on transparency in the
scientific aspects of risk assessments carried out by EFSA. Part 2: General
principles. The EFSA Journal 1051, 1-22.
__________________________________________________________________
The panel indicates that it deems any and all dossiers and studies submitted by the
[original] ‘applicants’ and within the scope of this review, but a dossier submitted
by someone, such as myself, who is not an industrial or commercial applicant is
not anywhere acknowledged or listed within the draft. More importantly, its
analysis and implications has been ignored.
The panel’s claim that “All studies on the safety and use of aspartame
commissioned by national authorities...” have been included is misleading. Many
of the documents in my dossier satisfy that description, but have not been
included. In the USA, where the Constitution stipulates that the US government
consists of three branches, namely the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial
branches, documents having a direct bearing on the safety of aspartame from
either the Executive and the Legislative branches should be satisfy this criterion.
None the less, at least 15 of the document from my dossier satisfy that criterion,
but have not been taken into account. Those documents include items: 3, 4, 5, 21,
22 and 25 from Congress and items 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18 and 19 from the
Executive branch.
In any case the criteria of inclusion should have been wide enough to encompass
any and all documents, from whatever source, that are relevant to an adjudication
of the safety of aspartame. Sadly that has not been the case, and that is reason
enough for those extra items to be included.
8In practice however the panel has adopted an interpretation of ‘scientific’ evidence
that is too narrow. It is narrow as it only includes evidence purporting directly to
report the conduct and results of laboratory experiments. It is too narrow because
it fails to include evidence about the ways in which many of those experiments
were conducted and reported. It is also consequently complacent as it often takes
reports of experiments at face value, as if they had been competently conducted
and accurately reported, despite the fact that I had provided EFSA with detailed
documentary evidence showing that at least 15 of those studies had previously
been discredited, and rightly so. If the documents that I submitted had taken into
consideration and proper account, then a rather different conclusion would have
resulted.
The list of studies that were deemed ‘pivotal’ by the FDA to the safety of
aspartame, and which were discredited by the investigations of the US FDA’s
Task Forces included 15 studies, that are referred to by their code numbers, which
have been used both by Searle, Monsanto, Nutrasweet and by EFSA. They
include 3 reviewed by the team lead by Bressler and then by the Bureau of Foods
Task Force, namely:
E-5
E-77/78
E-89
Those that were reviewed by the UAREP, were:
E-9
E-11
E-19
E-28
E-33/34
E-70
E-75/76
E-86/87
E-88
E-90
Nonetheless, every one of those studies has been included in the scope of EFSA’s
panel’s draft report. For the purposes of the panel’s draft, they are all deemed to
be ‘scientific’, and so included, while the documents providing detailed evidence
that they were based on poorly conducted experimental work, which was not
accurately reported, are in effect not deemed to satisfy the EFSA panel’s narrow
criteria for being ‘scientific’.
9To explain why none of the studies listed immediately above should have been
taken at face value, and why no reliance can or should be placed on their reports, it
is necessary to set out an historical narrative that derives in large part from the
documents of which my dossier submitted to EFSA was composed.
Key highlights from the history of the testing and regulatory review of
aspartame:
US pharmaceutical company G D Searle first filed a petition with the US FDA for
permission to market Aspartame in 1973, and the FDA initially proposed to grant
permission in 1974. Before the consequences of that decision could be
implemented, however, objections were raised by independent scientists alleging
that aspartame could cause mental retardation, brain lesions and neuroendocrine
disorders.1 Before those issues could be resolved, a further complex set of
objections were raised, the most important of which concerned the fact that some
scientists claimed that Searle had failed to conduct their safety tests properly, and
that the laboratory work had been incompetent.
The shortcomings in the testing and reporting of studies on aspartame were first
uncovered by scientists from the FDA’s drugs division. Dr. Adrian Gross and his
colleagues discovered, by examining carefully G D Searle’s laboratory records,
that a large proportion of Searle’s experimental work was profoundly unreliable.2
In response to those revelations the FDA established two special Task Forces; one
under the auspices of the Bureau of Drugs reviewed Searle’s safety evaluations of
their pharmaceutical products, while the second under the Bureau of Foods,
examined Aspartame.3
The Bureau of Foods Task Force had to institute careful reviews of 15 studies that
were judged to be ‘pivotal’ in the sense of being integral to the approval of
Aspartame. The FDA’s own internal review dealt with just three of these studies.
Two concerned the potential embryotoxicity and teratogenicity in both rats and
mice, while the third studied the carcinogenic potential to rats of a substance
known as DKP (short for diketopiperazine), which is a breakdown product of
Aspartame.4 The FDA claimed it was unable to conduct all the reviews because of
resource limitations, and so put pressure on Searle to oblige them to contract with
the organisation known as ‘the US Universities Association for Research and
1 McCann J.E., (1990) Sweet Success: How Nutrasweet Created a Billion Dollar Business,
Business One Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, Ch. 2
2 US Senate, Preclinical and Clincal Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, Joint Hearings before
the Sub-Committee on Health of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the Sub-
Committee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Part III,
Tuesday April 8th 1976, see esp. pp. 1-20
3 FDA Memorandum to Searle Investigation Steering Committee from the Searle Investigation
Task Force, Final Report of Investigation of G.D. Searle Company, 24 March 1976
4 Bressler J et al, Establishment Investigation Endorsements, of Searle Laboratories Division of
G.D. Searle, Chicago, for the Bureau of Foods, 18th July 1977 and 7th August 1977
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Evaluation in Pathology’ (or UAREP) to review and audit the validity of the
remaining 12 sets of tests.5
The FDA’s decision to outsource that work to the UAREP was puzzling, because
the FDA had just received a fresh tranche of funding from Congress, following the
Senate Committee hearings in April 8th 1976, to enable it more fully to scrutinize
toxicological data from the chemical industry. More, Adrian Gross explained to
his superiors that it was not only unsatisfactory for Searle to be involved in setting
the terms of reference for the UAREP investigation, but also that the UAREP did
not possess the requisite expertise to rule upon the conduct of animal
experiments.6 Gross considered that the main problem lay in the manner in which
the studies had been conducted, yet the UAREP was a professional organization of
pathologists, whose expertise lay in the interpretation of tissue samples, not in the
conduct of experiments with live animals. In the event, the UAREP restricted its
review to a consideration of the interpretation of pathological samples mounted
onto glass slides, and examined under microscopes, while ignoring or neglecting
the prior activities that had resulted in those tissue samples being located on those
slides. Unfortunately the problems were primarily located in those prior activities,
but they were outside the scope and competence of the UAREP team.
The EFSA panel does provide some discussion of the UAREP report, in the very
final section namely Annex L, which is on pages 243-5, lines 6935-7047. The text
provided in the draft is at a crucial point ungrammatical and unclear. A crucial
sentence is in lines 7007-9: “Overall, UAREP has interpreted the results only to
the experiments as designed, it has addressed itself to the question of whether the
experiments were carried out according to protocol plans and the accuracy and
reliability with which the experiments were performed and reported to the FDA.”
Given that the panel correctly states that the “…UAREP has interpreted the results
only to the experiments as designed…” it appears that the next clause is missing
one crucial word, namely ‘not’, so that it should read: “…it has [not] addressed
itself to the question of whether the experiments were carried out according to
protocol plans and the accuracy and reliability with which the experiments were
performed and reported to the FDA.” In the correspondence between Gross and
one of his superiors, Carlton Sharp, dated 4 November 1976 (Item 9 in my dossier
of autumn 2011) Gross draws attention to that probable outcome. Gross’s initial
expectations and retrospective comments on the report from the UAREP7 confirm
that the UAREP was not expected to, and in the event did not, ‘…addressed itself
to the question of whether the experiments were carried out according to protocol
5 Gross A. ‘Letter to Senator Howard Metzenbaum from Dr Adrian Gross’, October 30th 1987,
reproduced in "Nutrasweet" - Health and Safety Concerns, Hearing before the Committee on Labor
and Human Resources of the US Senate, 3rd November 1987, pp. 430-439
6 Gross A, Letter from Dr Adrian Gross to Mr. Carl Sharp at the Food and Drug Administration,
4th November 1976, reproduced in "Nutrasweet" - Health and Safety Concerns, Hearing before the
Committee on Labor and Human Resources of the US Senate, 3rd November 1987, pp. 440-44
7 Two letters from Dr Adrian Gross to Senator Howard Metzenbaum, both dated 3 November 1987,
and reproduced in the record of US Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
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plans…’ not did the UAREP consider ‘…the accuracy and reliability with which
the experiments were performed and reported to the FDA.’ For those reasons, the
judgement of the UAREP cannot, and so should not, be interpreted as having
‘authenticated’ the reports of those 12 studies.
The results of the research by the Bureau of Foods Task Force make puzzling but
interesting reading.8 One of the central allegations against Searle was that the
conclusions of their tests, as described in the documents submitted to the FDA,
failed accurately to reflect the raw data generated in the laboratories. The
summaries, it was argued, underestimated the possible toxicity of the chemical,
and its breakdown products such as DKP, and overestimated its safety when
compared to the raw data. There were, moreover, “...significant deviations from
acceptable procedures for conducting non-clinical laboratory studies.”9
It is puzzling, therefore, that the Task Force Report occasionally seems to
reproduce the mistake for which it criticises Searle. The conclusions of the Task
Force Report fail fully to reflect the information contained in the body of that
report. It states that while these 3 tests were not properly conducted, and although
there were marked differences between raw data and the summaries submitted in
the petition to the FDA, these differences: “...were not of such a magnitude that
they would significantly alter the conclusions of the studies.”10 The details of the
Task Force Report, however, derive from the Bressler Report suggest precisely the
opposite conclusion.11
The Task Force had difficulty in evaluating the studies, in part because in some
cases there just were no raw data with which to compare the supposed results. In
other cases, as the Task Force explained, it was impossible to determine which the
real raw results were, and which were subsequent revisions or summaries. In some
contexts, the Bressler team and the Bureau of Foods Task Force had to rely on
information and assumptions provided by Searle employees who had not been
involved in the original work. At worst, it was impossible to identify the occasion
on which a particular animals had died, for example, as the Report states:
“Observation records indicated that animal A23LM was alive at week 88, dead
from week 92 through week 104, alive at week 108, and dead at week 112.”12
Most scientists do not believe in reincarnation, and we should not expect that the
EFSA panel would do so either.
When reviewing the test on DKP, the Report lists no fewer than 52 major
discrepancies in the Searle submission.13 One of the central problems concerned
8 US FDA Bureau of Foods Task Force, Authentication Review of Data in Reports Submitted to the
FDA Concerning Aspartame, FDA Memo from the Bureau of Foods Task Force to Howard R.
Roberts, Acting Director of Foods (HFF-1), 28th September 1977
9 Bureau of Foods Task Force 1977, p. 3
10 Bureau of Foods Task Force Report, 1977
11 Bressler et al 1977
12 Bressler et al 7 Aug 1977 p. 2
13 Bressler et al, op cit pp. 2-8
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the quantities of DKP supposedly consumed by the rats. The FDA investigators
found no fewer than three separate documents with different specifications for the
content and the purity of the test substance, and they were unable to establish
precisely which specification, if any, was correct. It was impossible to reconcile
the quantity of the chemical requisitioned from stores with the quantities
supposedly fed to the animals. There were questions raised as to the extent to
which the DKP was uniformly incorporated into the animals’ food. There is
photographic evidence to show that the test substance was not properly ground,
and inadequately mixed, so that it might have been possible for the animals to
avoid the DKP while eating their food.14
The disparity between the substance and the conclusion of the FDA Task Force
report is hard to understand. The investigators found so many mistakes, which
were of such a magnitude, and of such importance, that it implies that no reliance
could be placed on the reports of these tests. The authors of the Report’s
conclusion, however, appear to have decided, perhaps for political reasons, to
interpret the evidence ‘generously’, while the evidence invites or even demands a
stricter assessment.
In May 1987 I contacted Dr Jacqueline Verrett, one of the members of the Bureau
of Foods Task Force, seeking an explanation. She provided the following
statement on the record:
“We were limited in what we could actually conclude about the
studies. We were not allowed to comment on the validity of any
study. It was an explicit instruction based on administrative rather
than scientific considerations. We were supposed to figure out what
the conclusions would have been if the studies had been fully and
correctly reported. We were obliged to ignore the protocols and the
non-homogeneity of the DKP. The Bressler Report did show that
non-homogeneity. Some animals did reject the DKP. Searle
initially said that it may not have been fully mixed but that that did
not matter, they later said that it had been fully mixed. We were
not allowed to consider those issues by the Bureau of Foods
administrator. Our remit was limited to a comparison of the
Bressler data against the original data. We were ham-strung in
being able to comment. The fact is that the studies should not have
been considered at all, and that was the position from the
beginning.” (Emphasis added)
Those comments from Jacqueline Verrett were reiterated in her statement at the
hearing on 3rd November 1987 of the US Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources.15
14 Bressler et al op cit pp. 3-4
15 US Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 3rd November 1987, item 24, pp. 383-
390
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In 1978, the UAREP submitted its 1062-page report, which concluded that the 12
studies it had audited were ‘authentic’.16 The limited competence, scope and
content of the UAREP report should not therefore be interpreted as having
certified the competence of the 12 studies it had reviewed. That is, however
precisely the manner in which the EFSA panel has interpreted it. (page 68, lines
2172-74)
Despite the fact that the Bureau of Foods Task Force and UAREP reviews had
been contrived to suggest that Aspartame had been properly tested, and that the
substance is safe, well-informed objectors were still not satisfied, and furthermore
a new complex set of objections to the safety of Aspartame were introduced.17
In an attempt to resolve the controversy once and for all, the FDA proposed the
establishment of a so-called Public Board Of Inquiry (or PBOI).18 This was a
unique institution; the procedure had never previously been used, and in all
probability will not be used again.19 The PBOI, which consisted of three academic
scientists who were independent of both the FDA and Searle, was used as an
alternative to the more usual formal evidential hearings, and was thought by some
people to be better suited to dealing with the numerous scientific and technical
complexities. The establishment of the Board was announced in June 1979, and it
met early in 1980, publishing its conclusions in October 1980.20 They had two sets
of issues on their agenda. On one of the crucial questions, their view was that
Aspartame consumption would not pose an increased risk of brain damage
resulting in mental retardation, but on the other vital issue they concluded that the
evidence available to them did not rule out the possibility that Aspartame could
induce brain tumours. Consequently the Board recommended that Aspartame
should not be permitted for use, pending the results of further testing.
In response, all of the parties, namely G. D. Searle & Co., the Bureau of Foods,
and the objectors, filed detailed exceptions to those parts of the Board’s
conclusions with which they disagreed. Nonetheless, it was the responsibility of
the Commissioner of the FDA to make a decision, for the Board’s role was merely
advisory and not decisive. In July 1981, the Commissioner Arthur Hayes Jr.,
announced his decision to approve the use of Aspartame in food products other
16 UAREP, Authentication Review of Selected Materials Submitted to the Food and Drug
Administration Relative to Application of Searle Laboratories to Market Aspartame, Universities
Associated for Research and Education in Pathology Inc., 18th November 1978
17 Graves F, ‘How Safe Is Your Diet Soft Drink?’, Common Cause, July/August 1984, pp. 25-43;
McCann J E, Sweet Success: How Nutrasweet Created a Billion Dollar Business, Business One
Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1990, pp. 37-48
18 Brannigan V, 1983, ‘The First FDA Public Board of Inquiry: The Aspartame Case’, Chapter 9 in
Law and Science in Collaboration, Nyhart JD & Carrow MM (eds), Lexington Books, Mass.
19 Smyth TR, 1983, ‘The FDA’s Public Board of Inquiry and the Aspartame Decision’, Indiana
Law Journal, Vol. 58 pp. 627-649
20 US FDA, Report of the Public Board of Inquiry into Aspartame, 1980
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than soft drinks.21 In doing so he made it clear that he disagreed with the PBOI’s
interpretation of the issue concerning brain tumours. Hayes took the view that the
available data were sufficient to persuade him that Aspartame does not cause brain
tumours in laboratory animals.
In July 1986, the US General Accounting Office confirmed that Arthur Hull
Hayes, who had approved Aspartame when FDA Commissioner, had subsequently
accepted an appointment as a Senior Scientific Consultant to Burson-Marsteller
two months after leaving the FDA. (GAO 1986) This is relevant because Burson-
Marsteller has acted as public relations representatives for G D Searle and
Nutrasweet, but the GOA report states that Hayes had not advised Searle before he
joined the FDA, or after joining Burson-Marsteller.
GD Searle’s official position, and subsequently that of Monsanto, Nutrasweet and
Ajinomoto too, has been that all the tests were properly conducted, and that no
charges were preferred against Searle in relation to Aspartame. In February 1986,
however, US Senator Howard Metzenbaum published a dossier of documents
which provided prima facie evidence that the reason why Searle had never been
prosecuted was because their firm of lawyers had exercised undue influence over
the US Federal Attorney’s office in Chicago until the Statute of Limitations had
expired and so ensured that no action could be taken.22 The evidence adduced by
Metzenbaum included a letter from the US FDA’s Chief Counsel Richard Merrill,
which is document 10 in my dossier, in which Merrill summarises some of the
most salient facts that he deemed sufficient for a criminal indictment.
The first paragraph of the front page of that letter is reproduced below:
21 Federal Register, Friday July 24, 1981, Part IV, Department of Health and Human Services,
Food and Drug Administration, Aspartame; Commisioner’s Final Decision, Docket No. 75F-0355,
pp. 38284-38308
22 Metzenbaum H, Dossier of 30 documents released by Senator Howard Metzenbaum, Washington
DC, US Senate 6.30pm EST, 6th February 1986
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In his role as FDA Chief Counsel, Richard Merrill was therefore satisfied that the
FDA had gathered sufficient evidence for G D Searle to be indicted for:
“…violations of the federal Food, Drugs and Cosmetics
Act…and the False Reports to the Government Act…and for
concealing material facts and making false statements in reports
of animal studies conducted to establish the safety of…the food
additive Aspartame.”
The dossier published by Metzenbaum in 1986 also included documents showing
that the firm of lawyers who represented Searle, Sidley & Austin, repeatedly
invited firstly Samuel K Skinner, the recipient of Merrill’s letter, as well as the
next two Chicago-based Federal Attorneys that were responsible for acting on
Merrill’s request to convene a Grand Jury to be convened to indict Searle, until the
statute of limitation had expired. That implies that the fact that Searle was not
indicted should not be interpreted as if it showed that Searle had no case to answer
or that Searle did not deserve to be indicted.
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My dossier of 30 documents, delivered to EFSA in the autumn of 2011, was
intended to provide EFSA with an opportunity to grasp the structure and some of
the details of that chronological saga, but the EFSA draft indicates that those
critical facts have either not been grasped or, for reasons that remain to be
explained, the EFSA panel and/or its secretariat have chosen to discount or ignore
those facts and the documents comprising the dossier I provided.
The way in which the panel interprets its criteria of selection of studies for
inclusion in, and exclusion from, this draft, reveal a predominantly narrow
interpretation of which evidence is deemed ‘scientific’, there is one conspicuous
exception to the narrow focus on results from laboratory experiments. The panel
includes and comments enthusiastically on just one review article, but no other,
and the panel fails to explain its inclusion.
That review paper, by Magnuson et al, 200723 focussed on: “…the neurotoxicity of
aspartame……” (page 84, line 2964) One of the several matters that the EFSA
panel failed to acknowledge is that several of the authors of that review had
commercial links to companies that produce or use aspartame. The panel
comments (page 84 lines 2969- 2973) that the conclusions of the review by
Magnuson et al were subsequently endorsed by an EFSA Advisory Forum. The
panel also neglects to acknowledge that members of that particular forum also
included individuals with commercial conflicts of interest. Those facts increase
the importance of the question as to why that review article received preferential
treatment not granted to any other reviews? It also highlights the more general
problem that the panel paid no attention to potential conflicts of interest amongst
the authors whose work is discussed.
The issue of conflicts of interest will be addressed in more detail towards the end
of this document; the next section focuses on how the EFSA panel interpreted the
data from those studies that were included in its draft.
23 Magnuson BA, Burdock GA, Doull J, Kroes, RM, Marsh GM, Pariza MW, Spencer PS, Waddell
WJ, Walker R and Williams GM, ‘Aspartame: a safety evaluation based on current use levels,
regulations, and toxicological and epidemiological studies’. Critical Reviews in Toxicology, 2007,
37, pp 629-727
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The panel’s criteria of interpretation: both explicit and implicit
This section focuses of the ways in which the panel has chosen to represent and
interpret information, data and results from the studies that have been included. If
more time had been available between the publication of the draft and the target
date for submitting responses, this document would have commented in detail on
more than just Section 3, which focuses on the Biological and toxicological data
of aspartame, but only that section will be discussed here.
While the putative toxicity of aspartame’s breakdown products, such as methanol
and DKP, are important, constraints of time have precluded a comprehensive
discussion of Sections 4 – 13, but Section 3 is pivotal, as it focuses specifically on
aspartame. It would however be surprising if the pattern found in Section 3 were
not also to be found in those sections.
The discussion in this section will highlight particular studies referred to by the
panel in Section 3, and in each case it will identify the way in which the panel
portrays the findings of those studies, and the ways in which it chose to interpret
the data, and the reasons given. The reasons that the panel provide constitute its
explicit criteria of interpretation of evidence. This discussion will frequently draw
attention to that the fact that reasons given are not sufficient to explain the panel’s
interpretations, and will identify key assumptions made by the panel that, although
they remained implicit and unacknowledged, are necessary to explain the panel’s
chosen interpretations.
Toxicologists and statisticians have together developed a useful vocabulary, which
will be used to simplify the following discussion, and diminish the repetition of
qualifying sub-clauses. From toxicologists we take the contrast between what is
often referred to as ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ results. In the terminology of
toxicologists, the results of a study are ‘positive’ if the evidence indicates the
presence of an adverse effect. Correspondingly, results are deemed as ‘negative’ if
the evidence does not indicate the occurrence of any adverse effects.
Statisticians have introduced a useful vocabulary used to refer to the possible
imprecision in the results of studies. Statisticians routinely refer to two main types
of errors: those termed a ‘false positive’ and those referred to as a ‘false negative’.
When applied to the results of toxicology tests, a ‘false positive’ arises when a
study appears to show a risk, although in truth no such risk arises.
Correspondingly, a ‘false negative’ arises when a study fails to show a risk when
in truth there is such a risk.
Summarising much of the following discussion using those terms, it will show that
the panel interprets almost every apparently negative study to be a true negative,
and every single apparently positive finding to be a false positive. When the panel
discusses its interpretations of the apparent findings of studies, it seems endlessly
18
alert for possible false positives, while being almost entirely blind to possible false
negatives. In that sense, the panel’s criteria of interpretation are asymmetric, and
that asymmetry constitutes an unscientific and unacceptable bias.
Rather than exhaustively identifying every one of at least 80 occasions on which
the panel treats an apparent negative as if a true negative, a few exceptions will be
highlighted, namely those occasions when apparently negative studies are
discounted as insufficiently reliable. On the other hand the discussion will
specifically identify and discuss each of the 27 occasions when apparent
‘positives’ are critiqued, discounted or rejected as failing to show any such risk.
That analysis will be supplemented, moreover, with the observation that 100% of
commercially-funded studies provide apparently ‘negative’ findings, whereas
100% of the studies that suggest ‘positive’ findings have been funded by
independent non-commercial sources. It will be argued, furthermore, that that
remarkably close correlation is not accidental, but systemic. To reach its
conclusion that aspartame is unproblematically safe, it was therefore necessary for
the panel to assume that all apparently negative studies are unproblematically
reliable, even though they have almost always been commercially-funded, while
all apparently positive studies are false positives, though they have all been
independently funded.
The following discussion examines each of the occasions at which the panel
rejected an apparent ‘positive’ and does so in the sequence in which they are
discussed in the EFSA draft.
1. In 1996 Olney and his colleagues published a paper24 that reported
epidemiological evidence that suggested that the introduction of aspartame to the
USA may have been responsible for an abrupt and significant increase in the
incidence of a particularly aggressive type of brain tumour, called glioblastomas.
Their argument was reinforced by two separate considerations. One was that an
early, but flawed Searle-sponsored, study conducted with monkeys had produced
evidence suggesting a link between aspartame consumption and blastomas.25
Secondly there was some biochemical evidence indicating a mechanism through
which aspartame could exert a carcinogenic effect namely as a consequence of a
chemical reaction known as ‘nitrosation’.26 Predictably, shortly after publication,
the US FDA and the US food and chemical industries discounted his analysis.
24 Olney JW, Farber NB, Spitznagel E and Robins LN, 1996 ‘Increasing brain tumor rates: is there
a link to aspartame?’ Journal of Neuropathology and Experimental Neurology, 1996, Vol 55, 1115-
1123
25 K. S. Rao, R. G. Mc Connell, and H. A. Waisman, 52 Week Oral Toxicity Study In The Infant
Monkey 10 October 1972
26 Meier I, Shephard SE and Lutz WK, 1990. ‘Nitrosation of aspartic acid, aspartame, and glycine
ethylester. Alkylation of 4-(p-nitrobenzyl)pyridine (NBP) in vitro and binding to DNA in the rat’,
Mutation Research, 1990, 238, pp 193-201; Shephard SE, Wakabayashi K and Nagao M,
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In the UK and Europe it was officially discounted because similar patterns had not
emerged in their local data, but that may well have been because the age-profile of
people consuming aspartame sweetened products differs between the USA and
this side of the Atlantic. In the UK and continental Europe, artificially sweetened
products are predominantly consumed by younger people rather than by ‘senior
citizens’, while it was the latter group that Olney argued were especially at risk.
The response of the panel to those claims is as follows:
“The conclusions of this epidemiological study have been criticised
by a number of scientists who questioned the methodology used and
the interpretation of the data…The SCF considered this report at its
107th meeting in June 1997 and concluded that the data did not
support the proposed biphasic increase in the incidence of brain
tumours…The issue has also been considered by the FDA and by the
UK Committee on Carcinogenicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer
Products and the Environment…The FDA stated that analysis of the
National Cancer Institute database on cancer incidence in the USA
did not support an association between the use of aspartame and
increased incidence of brain tumours… The COC agreed that the
findings provided no evidence for the proposed biphasic increase in
the incidence of either all brain tumours or selected tumour types in
the USA during the 1980’s and concluded that the data published by
Olney et al. (1996) did not raise any concerns about the use of
aspartame in the UK....”27
In other words, without adding to the judgements of others, the panel
simply accepted the judgements of other official bodies (the US FDA, the
SCF and the UK’s CoC). In acquiescing with those previous criticisms of
Olney and colleagues’ arguments the panel failed to take account of the
fact that before each of those bodies had reviewed and commenting on
Olney’s paper, they had previously asserted that aspartame was entirely
safe. If they had accepted Olney’s arguments they would have been
repudiating the scientific policy positions of the institutions in which they
were employed; and it takes far more courage to question the safety of a
product once it has already been approved than before its use is authorised.
2. In the middle years of the first decade of this century researchers at the
Ramazzini Foundation in Bologna, Italy started to publish the results of their
work, which are the only independently-funded long-term animal carcinogenicity
studies of aspartame. Results from a rat feeding study began to emerge in 2005 in
‘Mutagenic activity of peptides and the artificial sweetener aspartame after nitrosation’, Food and
Chemical Toxicology, 1993, 31, 323-329
27 EFSA Draft January 2013, page 34 lines 837-849
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the work of Belpoggi et al28 and by Soffritti and colleagues in 200629. The resuilts
of a similar study on mice emerged a few years later.
The Ramazinni Foundation, which one of the very few toxicology testing
laboratories in Europe that is independent of commercial organisations, performed
what it described as:
“...a mega-experiment using 7 groups of Sprague-Dawley rats
(100-150/sex/group), treated with APM in feed at various dose
levels (including one very close to the ADI for humans), from 8
weeks of age until natural death.”30
The conventional protocols for long-term rodent feeding studies typically involve
feeding test compounds to four groups of animal, with 50 males and 50 females in
a low-dose, a mid-dose and a high-dose groups as well as the corresponding
control group, making a total of 400 animals. Moreover, customary practice often
involves killing the animals when they are some two and a half years old, ie at 30
months. The Ramazzini studies therefore differed from customary practices by
using a total of 1,800 rats (900 males and 900 females) and testing them with 6
different dose levels and a corresponding set of controls.31 Several official bodies,
including the US FDA, JECFA, the SCF and the UK’s CoT, have discounted the
findings of these studies, complaining that they did not adopt a standard protocol.
While the Ramazzini protocol was non-standard, those deviations from the
standard by using more animals in more dose groups, and allowing them to die
naturally, together meant that the Ramazzini provided far greater sensitivity than
could be obtained from a standard study. Keeping and taking care of the animals
until they died may not be common practice, but since public health policy should
seek to protect consumers throughout their lives and not just until, for example,
they reach retirement, suggests that the Ramazzini protocol might well provide a
better model of the risk to the population of Europe than any study that ‘sacrifices’
28 Soffritti M, Belpoggi F, Esposti DD and Lambertini L, ‘Aspartame induces lymphomas and
leukaemias in rats’ European Journal of Oncology, 2005, 10,107–116;
www.ramazzini.it/fondazione/docs/AspartameGEO2005.pdf; Soffritti M, Belpoggi F, Degli
Esposti D, Lambertini L, Tibaldi E and Rigano A, 2’First experimental demonstration of the
multipotential carcinogenic effects of aspartame administered in the feed to Sprague-Dawley rats’
Environmental Health Perspectives, 2006, 114, 379-385; Soffritti M, Belpoggi F, Tibaldi E, Degli
Esposti D and Lauriola M, ‘Life-span exposure to low doses of aspartame beginning during pre-
natal life increases cancer effects in rats’, Environmental Health Perspectives, 2007, 115, 1293-
1297
29 M Soffritti et al, ‘First experimental demonstration of the multipotenial carcinogenic effects of
aspartame administered in the feed to Sprague-Dawley rats’ Environmental Health Perspectives,
2005, Vol. 114, No. 3, March 2006 pp. 379-385 available at www.ehponline.org/docs/2006/114-
3/toc.html
30 Soffritti M, Belpoggi F, Degli Esposti D, Lambertini L, ‘Aspartame induces lymphomas and
leukaemias in rats’, European Journal of. Oncology, 2005, Vol. 10, No 2, pp. 107-116
31 See
http://www.laleva.org/eng/2006/05/european_ramazzini_foundation_stands_behind_aspartame_stu
dy_results_announces_ongoing_research_on_artificial_sweeteners.html
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the animals prematurely. Indeed premature sacrifice might well result in
generating ‘false negatives’, and unacknowledged ones at that!
The abstract of the Ramazzini paper reported that the 2005 study had:
“…demonstrated for the first time that APM is a multipotential
carcinogenic agent, capable of inducing, in our experimental
conditions: a) a significant, dose-related increased incidence of
malignant tumor-bearing animals in males (p≤ 0.05) and in females 
(p≤ 0.01), in particular in females treated at 50,000 ppm (p≤ 0.01); b) 
a significant dose-related increase in lymphomas/leukaemias in both
males (p≤ 0.05) and females (p≤ 0.01), in particular in females 
treated at doses of 100,000 (p≤ 0.01), 50,000 (p≤ 0.01), 10,000 (p≤ 
0.05), 2,000 (p≤ 0.05), or 400 ppm (p≤ 0.01); c) a significant, dose-
related increased incidence (p≤ 0.01), of transitional cell carcinomas 
of the renal pelvis and ureter and their precursors (dysplasias) in
females treated at 100,000 (p≤ 0.01), 50,000 (p≤ 0.01), 10,000 (p≤ 
0.01), 2,000 (p≤ 0.05), or 400 ppm (p≤ 0.05); d) a significant, dose-
related increased incidence of malignant schwannomas of peripheral
nerves (p≤0.05) in males..” 
In the 2006 paper, the abstract states:
“The results of the study show: a) a significant dose-related increase
of malignant tumor-bearing animals in males (p<0.01), in particular
in the group treated at 2000 ppm (p<0.01); b) a significant increase of
the incidence in lymphomas/leukemias in males treated at 2000 ppm
(p<0.05) and a significant dose-related increase of the incidence of
lymphomas/leukemias in females (p<0.01), in particular in the group
treated at 2000 ppm (p<0.01); c) a significant dose-related increase of
the incidence of mammary cancer in females (p<0.05), in particular
in the group treated at 2000 ppm (p<0.05)…The results of this
carcinogenicity bioassay not only confirm, but also reinforce the first
experimental demonstration of APM’s multipotential carcinogenicity
at a dose level close to the acceptable daily intake (ADI) for humans.
Furthermore, the study demonstrates that when lifespan exposure to
APM begins during fetal life, its carcinogenic effects are increased.”
The comments provided by the panel’s draft on the Ramazzini studies state:
In 2006, at the request from the European Commission, the Scientific
Panel on Food Additives…assessed a long-term carcinogenicity
study in rats exposed to aspartame performed by European
Ramazzini Foundation (ERF) (Soffritti et al., 2006). On the basis of
all the evidence available from the Soffritti et al. (2006) study, other
recent studies and previous evaluations, the AFC Panel concluded
that there was no reason to revise the previously established ADI for
aspartame of 40 mg/kg bw/day as established by the SCF in
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1984…The [UK] Committee on Carcinogenicity of Chemicals in
Food Consumer Products and the Environment (COC) also evaluated
the Soffritti et al. (2006) study on aspartame following the evaluation
by EFSA (COC, 2006). In light of the limitations in the design of this
study and the use of animals with a high infection rate, the COC
considered that no valid conclusions could be drawn from this study.
Therefore, the COC agreed that the Soffritti et al. (2006) study did
not indicate a need for a review of the ADI for aspartame (COC,
2006). In 2009, following a request from the European Commission,
the ANS Panel delivered a scientific opinion on the results of a
second long-term carcinogenicity study in rats starting with pre-natal
exposure to aspartame, performed by the ERF (Soffritti et al., 2007).
The ANS Panel concluded that there was no indication of any
genotoxic or carcinogenic potential of aspartame and no reason to
revise the previously established ADI for aspartame of 40 mg/kg
bw/day (EFSA 2009a, 2009b).” (page 35, lines 871-887)
Apart from the deviations from conventional, but less sensitive, protocols the
panel’s main complaint about the Ramazzini study is that there was a high rate of
(respiratory) infections in the rats used in the study. While that is true, it is no less
true that the rates of respiratory infections amongst the groups exposed to doses of
the test compound were not significantly different from the rate in the control
groups, therefore the rates of infection cannot account for the dose-related
increased in cancer incidence, and therefore do not provide sound grounds for
discounting the findings.
Of course, there were imperfections in the studies carried out at the Ramazzini
Foundation, but all studies are characterised by some imperfections. The panel
refers to “…the limitations in the design of this study…” when in fact the study
had been designed and implemented so as to diminish the limitations that
customarily attend studies that conform to conventional protocols. Because the
Ramazzini studies were more sensitive than conventional studies, they are less
likely than conventional studies to have generated either false positives or false
negatives, but the panel neglected to acknowledge that fact.
While it has become customary for bodies such as the SCF, JECFA and EFSA to
portray studies showing no statistically significant increases in cancer rates with
increasing doses as if proving safety, it would be more accurate if their
interpretations were to state that, if the compound is carcinogenic, and if rodents
are good models for humans, than the increase in cancer rates is unlikely to be
more than eg 5%. But accurate interpretations along those lines are never
provided. Instead, ‘negative’ results from insensitive tests are routinely portrayed
as definitive.
The EFSA panel, and the previous officials judgements on which it has drawn,
however highlight and exaggerate the imperfections in the Ramazzini studies,
whiles under-reporting or entirely neglecting the shortcomings of other studies that
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fail to suggest aspartame pose any risks. The panel discounted the Ramazzini work
as a set of false positives, while accepting as true negatives, the negatives from
studies that had many more and far more serious imperfections. That reveals a
serious asymmetry that runs through the panel’s draft.
3. In 2010, the results emerged from a second long-term rodent feeding study from
the Ramazzini Foundation, but in this case the study used mice.32 The study’s
abstract stated that:
Methods
Six groups of 62–122 male and female Swiss mice were treated with
APM in feed at doses of 32,000, 16,000, 8,000, 2,000, or 0 ppm from
prenatal life (12 days of gestation) until death. At death each animal
underwent complete necropsy and all tissues and organs of all
animals in the experiment were microscopically examined.
Results
APM in our experimental conditions induces in males a significant
dose-related increased incidence of hepatocellular carcinomas
(P<0.01), and a significant increase at the dose levels of 32,000 ppm
(P<0.01) and 16,000 ppm (P<0.05). Moreover, the results show a
significant dose-related increased incidence of alveolar/bronchiolar
carcinomas in males (P<0.05), and a significant increase at 32,000
ppm (P<0.05).
Conclusions
The results of the present study confirm that APM is a carcinogenic
agent in multiple sites in rodents, and that this effect is induced in
two species, rats (males and females) and mice (males). No
carcinogenic effects were observed in female mice.”33
The panel says:
“In 2011 the ANS Panel and EFSA evaluated a new long-term
carcinogenicity study in mice exposed to aspartame from the 12th
day of fetal life until death (Soffritti et al., 2010)…The
authors…concluded that aspartame induced cancer in the livers
and lungs of male Swiss mice. EFSA and the ANS Panel
observed that the hepatic and pulmonary tumour incidences
reported by Soffritti et al. (2010) all fell within their own
historical control ranges for spontaneous tumours and noted that
Swiss mice are known to have a high background incidence of
spontaneous hepatic and pulmonary tumours. The overall
conclusion by the ANS Panel and EFSA was that the information
available from the Soffritti et al. (2010) publication did not give
32 Soffritti M, Belpoggi F, Manservigi M, Tibaldi E, Lauriola M, Falcioni L and Bua L, ‘Aspartame
administered in feed, beginning pre-natally through life span, induces cancers of the liver and lung
in male Swiss mice’, American Journal of Industrial Medicine, 2010, 53, 1197-1206
33 Ibid p. 1197
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reason to reconsider the previous evaluations of aspartame (EFSA
2011a, 2011b)…EFSA concluded that there was no evidence
available to support a causal relationship between the
consumption of artificially sweetened soft drinks and preterm
delivery and that additional studies were required to reject or
confirm the association (EFSA, 2011b).”34
The panel’s comment that the relevant cancer incidence rates in the mice: “…all
fell within their own historical control ranges for spontaneous tumours and noted
that Swiss mice are known to have a high background incidence of spontaneous
hepatic and pulmonary tumours…” does not provide conclusive grounds for
discounting the findings. When toxicological experiments are analysed and
interpreted, there are always choices to be made about whether to compare test
groups with the concurrent controls or with the historical averages for controls.
By selecting a preferred comparator, the apparent significance of a finding might
be increased or diminished.
In general, however, it is widely acknowledged that concurrent controls provides a
more appropriate comparator than historical controls, precisely because they were
concurrent and therefore a closer match to actual test conditions than historical
averages. In this case, the panel selected historical controls while the authors
emphasized concurrent controls. It is noteworthy that, when commenting on the
Ramazzini Foundation’s earlier rat study, the panel treated the concurrent controls
as a suitable comparator. This panel, and the previous EFSA panel in 2011,
selected historical controls and so explained how they came to treat these results as
a false positive. But the panel’s choice to compare to historical averages only
amounted to invoking a hypothesis about which comparator might be more
appropriate, not providing evidence to that effect. This is further evidence of the
panel’s asymmetric concern with potential false positives and false negatives.
4. In 2010, Halldorsson et al published the results of a large-scale long-term (7-
year) epidemiological study of sweetener consumption among 59,334 women in
Denmark35, which was funded by a grant from the EU, and they reported an
unexpected dose-related correlation between intakes of artificial sweeteners and
the premature delivery of babies. As artificial sweeteners other than aspartame
can be expected to have contributed to the results, the premature delivery of babies
may not be solely attributable to aspartame, but the EFSA panel interpreted it as if
it had no bearing on the risks that aspartame might pose, even though in Denmark
artificially-sweetened beverages are most commonly sweetened with aspartame.
34 pp 35-36 lines 896-913
35 Halldorsson TI, Strom M, Petersen SB and Olsen SF, ‘Intake of artificially sweetened soft drinks
5967 and risk of preterm delivery: a prospective cohort study in 59,334 Danish pregnant women’,
The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 2010, 92, 626-633
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The authors’ abstract stated:
“Objective:
We examined the association between intakes of sugar sweetened and
artificially sweetened soft drinks and preterm delivery. Design: We
conducted prospective cohort analyses of 59,334 women from the
Danish National Birth Cohort (1996–2002). Soft drink intake was
assessed in mid pregnancy by using a food frequency questionnaire.
Preterm delivery (,37 wk) was the primary outcome measure.
Covariate information was assessed by telephone interviews.
Results:
There was an association between intake of artificially sweetened
carbonated and noncarbonated soft drinks and an increased risk of
preterm delivery (P for trend: _0.001, both variables). In comparison
with women with no intake of artificially sweetened carbonated soft
drinks, the adjusted odds ratio for women who consumed 1 serving of
artificially sweetened carbonated soft drinks/d was 1.38 (95% CI:
1.15, 1.65). The corresponding odds ratio for women who consumed
4 servings of artificially sweetened carbonated soft drinks/d was 1.78
(95% CI: 1.19, 2.66). The association was observed for normal-
weight and overweight women. A stronger increase in risk was
observed for early preterm and moderately preterm delivery than with
late-preterm delivery. No association was observed for sugar-
sweetened carbonated soft drinks (P for trend: 0.29) or for sugar-
sweetened noncarbonated soft drinks (P for trend: 0.93).
Conclusions:
Daily intake of artificially sweetened soft drinks may increase the
risk of preterm delivery. Further studies are needed to reject or
confirm these findings.”36
The panel firstly comments on Halldorsson et al, on page 35-6, lines 905-917, in
the following terms as:
“The authors…concluded that there was an association between
intake of artificially sweetened soft drinks and preterm delivery in the
cohort; however, additional studies were required to reject or confirm
the association. The ANS Panel advised EFSA on the need for
epidemiological expertise to provide additional insights on the
methodology and statistical aspects of this study, taking into account
confounding factors (EFSA, 2011a). EFSA concluded that there was
no evidence available to support a causal relationship between the
consumption of artificially sweetened soft drinks and preterm
delivery and that additional studies were required to reject or confirm
the association (EFSA, 2011b). In 2011, the French Agency for Food,
Environmental, and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES) also
concluded that no causal relationship between the consumption of
36 Am J Clin Nutr 2010; vol 92: p626
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artificially sweetened beverages and the risk of pre-term delivery was
established, and, as the authors of the Halldorsson study mentioned,
there was a need to perform further studies to negate or confirm the
results (ANSES, 2011).”
EFSA Panel comments again on this study, pages 86-7 lines 3064-5: “Statistically
significant trends were found in the risk of pre-term delivery with increasing
consumption of artificially sweetened drinks …”
The Panel then concedes: (page 87 lines 3076 -84):
“…that the prospective design and large size of the study sample
were major strengths, and there were no major flaws in the methods
used. However, risk estimates may have been inflated by residual
confounding (including by year of delivery). In addition, the Panel
noted that it was not possible to identify a mode of action for the
association between pre-term delivery and an exposure measure
based on consumption of artificially sweetened drinks. Not all
confounding factors are accounted for (i.e. not taking into account
other dietary sources of methanol, or distinguishing the use of a
specific artificial sweetener, e.g. aspartame). Therefore, given these
limitations, the Panel agreed with the authors who concluded that
replication of their findings in another experimental setting is
warranted.”
It is conspicuous that the panel acknowledged “…that the prospective design and
large size of the study sample were major strengths, and there were no major flaws
in the methods used…” but sought to discount the results by postulating that
several possible confounding factors might have contributed to the increased risks.
The panel provided no data to substantiate that hypothesis, but rather treated the
possible availability of such hypotheses as sufficient reasons to discount the
findings.
It is worth noting that Halldorsson et al never claimed that they had causal proof of
a link between consuming eg aspartame and premature births, but rather that they
had provide suggestive evidence, which should be followed up in subsequent
studies. The EFSA panel however fails to call for follow-up studies; instead it
portrays the issue of aspartame’s safety as definitively settled.
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5. In 1998, Trocho et al published a study of the biological fate of the methanol
that derives from the decomposition of aspartame 1998.37 The authors’ summary
of their study is reproduced below.
The study by Trocho and colleagues was supported in part by a Public Health
Service grant from the National Cancer Institute and by the California Department
of Health Services. The authors concluded that aspartame consumption may be
hazardous because of its contribution to the formation of formaldehyde adducts.
In response, the EFSA panel states:
“…the methodology used by Trocho was not able to differentiate
between 14C incorporated into proteins through the metabolic one
carbon tetrahydrofolate pathway and direct covalent reaction (e.g.
through Schiff base formation) of formaldehyde with proteins. The
authors failed to compare the single radioactive species obtained after
37 Trocho C, Pardo R, Rafecas I, Virgili J, Remesar X, Férnandez-Lopéz JA and Alemany M, 1998.
‘Formaldehyde derived from dietary aspartame binds to tissue components in vivo’ Life Sciences,
1998, 63, 337-349
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hydrolysis of plasma protein and derivatisation of amino acids, with
several of the amino acids susceptible to reaction with formaldehyde.
This did not exclude the possibility that the single radioactive species
in hydrolysates was not a trace level of a Maillard adduct (and
therefore an artefact from sample processing) as well as omitting
other controls.”38
The panel’s remark that the study did ‘…not exclude the possibility…’ revealed
that it had no evidence that the results obtained by Trocho et al were a false
positive, but it chose to treat them as a false positive because that possibility could
not be excluded, by reference for example to a hypothesis that was not in turn
supported by evidence. The panel chose to treat the result of this study as
unreliable because it was not totally conclusive; it is however conspicuous that the
panel were willing to treat apparently negative studies as if conclusive, without
considering corresponding hypotheses that might have discredited them. For the
panel, a guess as to a possibility was sufficient to discount these positive findings .
That revealed that the hurdle set for apparent positives was exceptionally high,
whereas the hurdle that apparently negative studies needed to cross to be deemed
reliable was far lower.
6 & 7. Abhilash et al, 2011 and 2013
In 2011 and 2013 Abhilash et al published a pair of papers in which they reported
firstly effects of aspartame on the livers of rats and secondly on rats’ brains.39 The
studies were conducted at the Mahatma Gandhi University, in India, and funded
from independent non-commercial sources.
The abstract of the first paper read:
“The present study evaluates the effect of long term intake of
aspartame, the artificial sweetener, on liver antioxidant system and
hepatocellular injury in animal model. Eighteen adult male Wistar
rats, weighing 150–175 g, were randomly divided into three groups
as follows: first group was given aspartame dissolved in water in a
dose of 500 mg/kg b.wt.; the second group was given a dose of 1000
mg/kg b.wt.; and controls were given water freely. Rats that had
received aspartame (1000 mg/kg b.wt.) in the drinking water for 180
days showed a significant increase in activities of alanine
aminotransferase (ALT), aspartate aminotransferase (AST), alkaline
phosphatase (ALP) and c-glutamyl transferase (GGT). The
concentration of reduced glutathione (GSH) and the activity of
glutathione peroxidase (GPx), and glutathione reductase (GR) were
38 pages 53-54: lines 1474-1505
39 Abhilash M, Paul MV, Varghese MV and Nair RH, ‘Effect of long term intake of aspartame on
antioxidant defense status in liver’ Food and Chemical Toxicology, 2011, 49, 1203-1207; Abhilash
M, Sauganth Paul MV, Varghese MV and Nair RH, ‘Long-term consumption of aspartame and
brain antioxidant defense status’ Drug and Chemical Toxicology, 2013, 39, 135-140
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significantly reduced in the liver of rats that had received aspartame
(1000 mg/kg b.wt.). Glutathione was significantly decreased in both
the experimental groups. Histopathological examination revealed
leukocyte infiltration in aspartame-treated rats (1000 mg/kg b.wt.). It
can be concluded from these observations that long term
consumption of aspartame leads to hepatocellular injury and
alterations in liver antioxidant status mainly through glutathione
dependent system.” (emphasis added)
The abstract of the second paper reads:
“The present study investigated the effect of long-term intake of
aspartame, a widely used artificial sweetener, on antioxidant
defense status in the rat brain. Male Wistar rats weighing 150-
175 g were randomly divided into three groups as follows: The
first group was given aspartame at a dose of 500 mg/kg body
weight (b.w.); the second group was given aspartame at dose of
1,000 mg/kg b.w., respectively, in a total volume of 3 mL of
water; and the control rats received 3 mL of distilled water. Oral
intubations were done in the morning, daily for 180 days. The
concentration of reduced glutathione (GSH) and the activity of
glutathione reductase (GR) were significantly reduced in the
brain of rats that had received the dose of 1,000 mg/kg b.w. of
aspartame, whereas only a significant reduction in GSH
concentration was observed in the 500-mg/kg b.w. aspartame-
treated group. Histopathological examination revealed mild
vascular congestion in the 1,000 mg/kg b.w. group of aspartame-
treated rats. The results of this experiment indicate that long-
term consumption of aspartame leads to an imbalance in the
antioxidant/pro-oxidant status in the brain, mainly through
the mechanism involving the glutathione-dependent
system.”40 (emphasis added)
Not surprisingly, the panel comments (page 60 lines 1807-1817) on the small size
of the samples of rats; 6 animals per group is a small sample. They also
complained that only two doses were tested and the dose at which some
statistically significant effects were reported was 25 times greater than the ADI.
What the panel did not acknowledge however was that it accepted data from
apparently negative studies with similar sized test groups, and that the practice of
using high doses to compensate for a small sample size is a widely adopted and
customary practice. The panel also remarked that the observed changes were mild
and limited both qualitatively (as many markers of antioxidant system were
unchanged) and quantitatively. The panel argues that the findings cannot be
interpreted in the absence of historical values from the institute for these rats. The
panel however fails to make similar demands in relation to the majority of studies
that are apparently negative.
40 See http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22385158 accessed 12 February 2013
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The Panel also noted that the method used by the authors for the determination of
GSH was not specific for GSH (since it detects a variety of thiols), and remarked
that focal inflammatory infiltration of the liver is a variable (even within the same
liver) but a common occurrence in rodents, particularly in the portal tract regions
of the liver. In conclusion the panel states that it: “…considered that the
histopathological findings presented in the reports did not convincingly support
the conclusion of the authors.”
Once again, it is evident that the implicit hurdle for studies indicating apparently
positive evidence of harm is set very high, namely as sufficiently conclusive to
provide ‘convincing support’, which contrasts markedly with the implicit height of
the hurdle by reference to which apparently negative studies are judged. In those
cases mere plausibility is often sufficient. The panel discounted the conclusions of
these studies by opportunistically invoking hypotheses, not by reference to specific
evidence.
8. Rencuzogullari et al 200441
The paper by Rencuzogullari et al reported on their study designed to test the
genotoxicity of aspartame with 3 different types of tests: 1) in vitro in a sister
chromatid exchange assay, 2) a chromosomal aberration test and 3) a micronucleus
test on human lymphocytes. The research was funded from an independent non-
commercial source.
Rencuzogullari and colleagues reported that they had found dose-related and
statistically significant increases for chromosomal aberrations after both 24 and 48
hours and for induction of micronuclei, although only at the highest dose-levels
employed (2000 μg/ml).42
EFSA responded saying:
“The Panel noted that it cannot be excluded that the positive findings
resulted from indirect effects (non-physiological culture conditions)
since pH and osmolality were not reported. This conclusion is
supported by negative findings obtained for SCEs in parallel cultures;
however, these are not usually induced by indirect effects. The
possible involvement of an indirect mechanism in the reported
clastogenic effect is also supported by the fact that the study was
performed in the absence of S9 metabolism: in these experimental
conditions, no DNA damaging activity of aspartame is expected, as
the molecule does not show any electrophilic centre directly reactive
41 Rencuzogullari E, Tuylu BA, Topaktas M, Ila HB, Kayraldiz A, Arslan M and Diler SB,
‘Genotoxicity of aspartame’, Drug and Chemical Toxicology, 2004, 27, 257-268
42 EFSA Panel draft, pages 53-54: lines 1474-1505
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with DNA. The Panel considered that the methods implemented were
not sufficiently robust to support the results reported.”43
The pattern observed here matches once again a pattern encountered previously
and discussed above. An apparently positive finding of possible toxicity is
discounted by reference to opportunistically-invoked hypotheses, for which no
evidence is provided. The implicit hurdles by reference to which these apparently
positive findings were judged by the panel are very high; they demand in effect
conclusive proof. The implicit hurdled by reference to which apparently negative
results are judged are far less demanding and more forgiving. This betrays a
consistently asymmetric pattern and an implicit bias that characterises the panel’s
entire draft.
9. US National Toxicology Program, 200544
The panel reports (page 63 lines 1941-1953) a set of:
“Peripheral blood micronucleus tests…conducted in male and female
transgenic mice…after 9 months of exposure to aspartame at doses
ranging from 3.1 to 50 g/kg diet…In female…haploinsufficient mice,
the results of the test were judged positive by the authors of the study,
based on a trend test revealing a statistically significant 2.3 fold
increased frequency of micronucleated erythrocytes seen in the 50
g/kg diet group… However, the Panel noted that the incidence of
micronucleated erythrocytes in female controls was the lowest among
the historical control values of the same laboratory; this rendered the
outcome of the trend analysis positive. Nevertheless, the observed
incidence of micronucleated erythrocytes in the highest dose group fell
outside the range of the historical controls. However, the Panel also
noted that the reported increase in micronucleated erythrocytes was
observed in one gender only… (positive in female but not in male p53
haploinsufficient mice) but negative in the other two strains, and
overall, did not indicate a genotoxic potential for aspartame.”
Once again, opportunistic grounds are invoked to discount an apparently positive
finding, even though the study came from one of the leading US government
research institutions. Given that the results could be interpreted differently when
compared to concurrent controls or to historical controls, the panel chooses the
historical controls, even though ceteris paribus concurrent controls provide the
most appropriate comparator. Furthermore, the fact that the adverse effect was
only in the females but not the males does not entail that the apparent effects were
43 Op cit page 62 lines 1899-1907
44 NTP (US National Toxicology Program), 2005. NTP report on the toxicology studies of
aspartame (CAS No. 22839-47-0) in genetically modified (FVB Tg.AC hemizygous) and B6.129-
Cdkn2atm1Rdp (N2) deficient mice and carcinogenicity studies of aspartame in genetically
modified [B6.129-Trp53tm1Brd (N5) haploinsufficient] mice (feed studies).National Toxicology
Program Genetically Modified Model Report, Oct. 2005, pp. 1-222
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spurious. There is no good reason why adverse effects should only be deemed real
and toxicological significant if they occur in both genders. The panel does not
require gender symmetry from ostensibly negative studies.
10. Bandyopadhyay et al. 200845
The panel discusses Bandyopadhyay et al. 2008 on pages 63-4, lines 1963-9. That
study was funded by the University Grants Commission, New Delhi. (pers comm
email, 1 February 2013), ie by a non-commercial publicly-funded source. The
panel reports that the study involved administering:
“… aspartame as a single dose of 0 (control), 7, 14, 28 and 35 mg
aspartame/kg bw to mice (four males/group) by oral gavage, and at the
highest dose-level, aspartame was reported to induce DNA damage in
bone marrow cells.” However, the Panel evaluated the study (lines
1965-9) as poorly reported and noted that the dose levels used were
low compared to other studies reporting negative results, and that an
insufficient number of cells was scored (total of 50 cells/animal).
Therefore, the Panel considered that the methods implemented were
not sufficiently robust to support the results reported, and that no
conclusion could be drawn from it.”
The panel’s tactic is to refer to other studies that had reported negative results, but
without any explanation as to why their indications should be preferred over those
reported by Bandyopadhyay et al. The implicit premise seems to be that a negative
study can always trump a positive one, though never the other way round; but such
a premise simply begs the question at issue.
11. AlSuhaibani (2010)46
The panel observes that:
“AlSuhaibani…tested aspartame for its ability to induce
chromosome aberrations (CA) SCE and to affect the mitotic index
(MI) in bone marrow cells of mice (five males/group; by gavage) at
dose levels of 0 (control), 3.5, 35 and 350 mg aspartame/kg bw. The
authors concluded that aspartame induced CA at 35 and 350 mg/kg
bw, but neither dose level induced SCE nor decreased the MI. The
Panel noted that an insufficient number of cells were scored...
Furthermore, no positive control was included in the study and any
supplementary information on cytotoxicity relevant for CA and
SCE-analysis in the present experiment was lacking. The Panel
considered that the methods implemented were not sufficiently
45 Bandyopadhyay A, Ghoshal S and Mukherjee, A, 2’Genotoxicity testing of low-calorie
sweeteners: aspartame, acesulfame-K, and saccharin’, Drug and Chemical Toxicology, 2008, 31,
447-457
46 Alsuhaibani ES, ‘In vivo cytogenetic studies on aspartame’, Comparative and functional
genomics, 2010, pii: 605921
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robust to support the results reported, and that no conclusion could
be drawn from the study.” 47
While the panel complained that an insufficient number of cells had been scored,
they provided no indication as to how many might be sufficient, or a reference to a
source or sources for such a figure. AlSuhaibani may not have included a positive
control, but studies on the genotoxicity of aspartame, and many other compounds
too, that have officially been deemed acceptable have neglected to include positive
controls, but as long as they suggested no adverse effects, those shortcoming
passed unremarked.
12. Karikas et al. (1998)48
The panel states that Karikas and colleagues:
“…reported a non-covalent interaction of excess aspartame, aspartic
acid and phenylalanine with calf thymus DNA, inferred from the
altered chromatographic profile of DNA. The Panel considered these
findings, obtained in an acellular system in presence of excess
aspartame, of minimal relevance for the evaluation of the genotoxic
potential of aspartame.”
No explanation of why the findings were deemed ‘…of minimal relevance…’ was
provided by the panel. The panel’s apparent dismissal seems based on nothing
more than the fact that they suggest an apparent positive; which on its own appears
to have been sufficient for a routine dismissal.
13 and 14. Meier et al 199049 and Shephard et al 199350
Meier, Shephard and Lutz’s non-commercially funded study is reported to have:
“…investigated the kinetic of formation, stability and reactivity of
nitrosation products of aspartic acid, aspartame, and glycine ethyl
ester. Nitrosation products were obtained in vitro, with incubation of
40 mM substrate and nitrite at pH 2.5 for varying times. The
nitrosation products displayed an ‘alkylating’ activity in vitro…” 51
Shephard et al were funded by the Foundation for Promotion of Cancer Research
of Japan. They also addressed the possible consequences of nitrosation, and the
47 page 64 lines 1978-86)
48 Karikas GA, Schulpis KH, Reclos G and Kokotos G, ‘Measurement of molecular interaction of
6052 aspartame and its metabolites with DNA’ Clinical Biochemistry, 1998, 31: 405-407.
49 Meier I, Shephard SE and Lutz WK, ‘Nitrosation of aspartic acid, aspartame, and glycine
ethylester. Alkylation of 4-(p-nitrobenzyl)pyridine (NBP) in vitro and binding to DNA in the rat’,
Mutation Research, 1990, 238:193-201
50 Shephard SE, Wakabayashi K and Nagao M, ‘Mutagenic activity of peptides and the artificial
6365 sweetener aspartame after nitrosation’ Food and Chemical Toxicology, 1993, 31, 323-329
51 Page 64 lines 1993-9
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panel combines its discussion of these two studies. The panel reports that in this
study:
“Aspartame and several naturally occurring dipeptides were nitrosated
in vitro at low pH (3.5) in the presence of 40 mM nitrite and tested for
mutagenicity in Salmonella typhimurium TA100. The nitrosation
products of some dipeptides (Trp-Trp, Trp-Gly) and aspartame
exhibited a direct mutagenic activity, which was related by the study
authors to the nitrosation of their primary amino groups.”52
The panel responds with:
“…the Panel noted the harsh conditions utillised for the in vitro
nitrosation of substrates and considered the results of doubtful
relevance for the assessment of the genotoxic risk posed by the dietary
intake of aspartame or other natural amino acids and dipeptides.”53
The conditions in which the ingredients had been nitrosated were on the harsh
side, but such conditions have been used in other studies, which have officially
been deemed reliable, at least when they provided apparently negative results.
15. Collison et al. (2012a)54
Collison et al were funded by an independent non-commercial funder. They
studied some interactive effects of neonatal exposure to monosodium glutamate
and aspartame on glucose homeostasis. The panel reported that:
“Mouse offspring (12 to 18/sex/group) were bred, weaned and
maintained on the following diet groups for 17 weeks: standard diet
(control), standard diet with MSG (120 mg/kg bw/day) alone,
standard diet with aspartame (approximately 50 mg/kg bw/day)
alone, standard diet with MSG and aspartame…Aspartame alone
caused a 1.6-fold increase in fasting blood glucose and reduced
insulin sensitivity…The combination of MSG and aspartame
increased body weight, and caused a further 2.3-fold increase in
fasting blood glucose compared to control diets… A positive
correlation between aspartame intake and body weight at 6 weeks and
17 weeks…The authors concluded that aspartame exposure might
promote hyperglycaemia and insulin intolerance, and MSG might
interact with aspartame to impair further glucose homeostasis.”55
52 Page 64 lines 2000-4
53 Page 64 lines 2005-8
54 Collison KS, Makhoul NJ, Zaidi MZ, Al-Rabiah R, Inglis A, Andres BL, Ubungen R, Shoukri M
and Al-Mohanna FA, ‘Interactive effects of neonatal exposure to monosodium glutamate and
aspartame on glucose homeostasis’, Nutrition and Metabolism, 2012, 14, 9, 58
55 Page 81 lines 2796 -2810
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The panel commented that:
“…the mouse strain used in this study is known to harbour a
dominant trait showing a high susceptibility to diet-induced type-2
diabetes, as well as obesity and atherosclerosis …The Panel also
noted that no dose-response was assessed in this study and that other
authors (Berglund et al., 200826) have reported higher insulin and
glucose basal levels in the C57BL/6J mice strain suggesting that
those parameters vary in that mice strain. The Panel also noted that
phenylalanine and glutamate can also arise from the protein content
of the diet and thus the actual contribution of aspartame to the total
phenylalanine and glutamate amino acids pool should be clearly
defined to be able to attribute exclusively an increment in fetal amino
acid pool to aspartame intake. Finally, the Panel also observed that
short term preliminary interventional trials undertaken in human
volunteers suggest that test meals containing aspartame significantly
reduce postprandial glucose levels and insulin levels compared to a
test meal containing sucrose (Anton et al., 2010).”56
The mouse strain might be sensitive in the way the panel complained, but
toxicological principles ostensibly stipulate that judgements should be based on
effects in the most sensitive variety of the most sensitive species. Unfortunately
that ‘principle’ is more frequently breached than observed. The panel chooses to
disparage the strain of mice used by Collinson and colleagues as rather variable,
but the human population that the experiment was trying to model is highly
variable. Moreover the panel provides no evidence that other stains are less
variable. The observed effects may not have shown a linear dose-effect
relationship, but there are many good biochemical reasons for recognising that not
all mechanisms causing adverse changes exhibit linear dose-effect relationships.
In the case of the Anton et al 2010 study, they only worked with 19 healthy lean
and 12 obese individuals, which can hardly be deemed to have constituted an
adequately representative sample of humanity, let alone of residents of the EU.
56 Lines 2815-2825)
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17. Collinson et al PLoS (2012b)57
In this non-commercially-funded study Collinson et al state that they:
“… investigated the effects of chronic lifetime exposure to aspartame,
commencing in utero, on changes in blood glucose parameters, spatial
learning and memory in C57BL/6J mice.”58
The panel’s characterisation of the study is that:
“…the effects of neonatal exposure to aspartame, commencing in
utero, on changes in blood glucose parameters, spatial learning and
memory in…mice…between 12 and 18 per group…administered
standard diet (control) or standard diet with aspartame
(approximately 50 mg/kg bw/day) for 17 weeks. Increased weight
gain, increased fasting glucose levels and decreased insulin
sensitivity was observed in treated male mice compared to controls.
These effects were less apparent in females, which did however show
significantly raised fasting glucose levels…. Overall, the authors of
the study concluded that lifetime exposure to aspartame,
commencing in utero, might affect spatial cognition and glucose
homeostasis in C57BL/6J mice, particularly in males.”59
To which panel responded with:
“…only one dose was used rendering thus any assessment of dose-
response relationship not possible. The Panel noted that the findings
in mice reported …might not apply to other species, since in a large
study on Sprague-Dawley rats (Holder, 1989) performances …was
similar for rat pups given aspartame…compared to controls.”
Using a single dose and a control cannot provide a characterisation of a dose-
response relationship, but that does not mean that the response was one that should
be discounted or neglected. The responses of Sprague-Dawley rats may well be
different from those of C57BL/6J mice, but that provides no grounds for
supposing that the Sprague-Dawley rats provide better models for the effects on
humans than C57BL/6J mice; maybe the rat study could be criticised for failing to
show effects that Collision et al found in mice. Once again implicit assumptions
are a stronger influence of the panel’s judgement than the data it purports to
interpret.
57 Collison KS, Makhoul NJ, Zaidi MZ, Saleh SM, Andres B, Inglis A, Al-Rabiah R and Al-
Mohanna FA, 2012b ‘Gender dimorphism in aspartame-induced impairment of spatial cognition
and insulin sensitivity’, Public Library of Science One, 7, e31570
58 Ibid. page 1
59 Page 81-2, lines 2826-285
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18. Puică 2008 & 200960
This non-commercially funded group of researchers concluded their 2008 paper by
saying:
“The chronic administration of Aspartame at prepubertal stage on
juvenile rabbits induced neurodegenerative effects especially in the
circumventricular organs (CVO) of hypothalamus; and severe
structural and functional alterations in hypothalamic-pituitary axis.
The experimental results show that there is an increased sensibility of
the immature brain in prepubertal stage of onthogenetic development
following chronic exposure to Aspartame. The degenerative aspects of
brain and pituitary observed in Aspartame-treated rabbits; suggests
that it is reasonable to assume that the same infant-to-adult relationship
would be true for the Aspartame consumption in humans to children in
the prepubertal period of development.”
The panel responded saying:
“…that the interpretation of these studies was not possible because of
the lack of experimental details, the absence of appropriate control
animals and of statistical analysis of the data.” 61
The lack of details may well be problematic, but then it is puzzling why the
panel did not take the opportunity officially to request that information? If
the panel had been more inquisitive it might have seen something it was not
expecting.
19. Alleva et al, 201162
Alleva and colleagues are non-commercially funded public sector research
scientists in Italy. Their study examined whether exposure to aspartame might
adversely influence the formation of new blood vesseesl. Their abstract says:
“We evaluated the angiogenic effect of APM [aspartame] in an in vitro
model using blood vessel development assay… Exposure to …APM
increases the levels of inflammatory mediator…and their soluble
receptors released from endothelial cells into the medium. APM
treatment induces VEGF-pathway activation …APM at low doses is
an angiogenic agent that induces regenerative cytokine production
60 Puică C, Crăcium C, Rusu M, Cristescu M, Borsa M and Roman I, ‘Ultrastructural aspects 
concerning the hypothalamus-pituitary complex reactivity following chronic administration of
aspartame in juvenile rabbits. Bulletin UASVM, Veterinary Medicine, 2008, 65, 424-429;  Puică C, 
Crăcium C, Rusu M, Cristescu M, Borsa M and Roman I, ‘Ultrastructural aspects concerning the 
hypothalamus-pituitary complex reactivity following chronic administration of aspartame in
juvenile rats’. Studia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş”, Seria Ştiintele Vieţii, 2009, 19, 19-24
61 Page 84 lines 2946-7
62 Alleva R, Borghi B, Santarelli L, Strafella E, Carbonari D, Bracci M and Tomasetti, M, ‘In vitro
effect of aspartame in angiogenesis induction’ Toxicology in vitro, 2011, 25, 286-293
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leading to the activation of MAPKs and resulting in the formation of
new blood vessels.”63
The panel responded noting:
“…that production of ROS [reactive oxygen species] could not be attributed
to specific cell types but rather a general phenomenon…the authors did not
evaluate the fate of aspartame in culture medium ascertaining whether it was
hydrolysed to its usual metabolites or remained intact. For induction of
angiogenesis, no positive and negative controls were reported. The Panel
also noted that no formation of ROS in different in vivo and in vitro
genotoxicity studies following treatment with aspartame or methanol
(McCallum et al., 2011a,b) has been observed. This suggests that the finding
reported might be ascribed specifically to the conditions of the study. For
these reasons, the Panel considered these data not relevant for the risk
assessment of aspartame.”64
The panel’s comment is puzzling because it misleadingly suggests that McCallum
et al had studied effects of aspartame, but their paper only reported a test
conducted with methanol, not with aspartame. The panel also failed to comment
on the significant fact that the study by McCallum and colleagues was funded in
part by a trade association representing methanol producers. (See Methanol
Institute at http://www.methanol.org/ ) Once again, the panel was keen to
benchmark a positive study against a negative study, rather than the other way
round; the negative study is assumed to be correct, but that is an assumption not an
empirical result.
20. Linda Englund-Ögge, et al65
Linda Englund-Ögge and her Norwegian colleagues published in 2012 the
findings of their non-commercially-funded study of the impact of consuming both
sugar-sweetened (SS) and artificially-sweetened (AS) soft drinks of the likelihood
that pregnant women would deliver their babies prematurely. The abstract of paper
says: “This study suggests that a high intake of both AS and SS beverages is
associated with an increased risk or preterm delivery.”66 This epidemiological
study was particularly powerful, because the researchers analysed data from a
remarkably large sample comprising 60,761 women.
The panel’s discussion of this study is located immediately after a discussion of
Halldorsson et al, which is reviewed above as item 4. The panel prefaces its
remarks on this study by saying:
63 op cit p 286
64 Page 85 lines 2999-3007
65 Englund-Ögge L, Brantsæter AL, Haugen M, Sengpiel V, Khatibi A, Myhre R, Myking S,
Meltzer HM, Kacerovsky M, Nilsen RM and Jacobsson B, ‘Association between intake of
artificially sweetened and sugar-sweetened beverages and preterm delivery: a large prospective
cohort study’, The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 2012, 96, 552-559
66 Op cit p 552
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“To explore whether the findings of Halldorsson et al. (2010) could be
replicated, another study (Englund-Ögge et al., 2012) investigated the
relation between consumption of artificially sweetened and sugar-
sweetened soft drinks during the first 4-5 months of pregnancy and
subsequent pre-term delivery in a large cohort of Norwegian
women.”67
The implication of the panel’s comment is that the latter study was framed by
reference to its predecessor, but that is implausible because the latter began before
the former had been reported.
The panel commented on Englund-Ögge et al saying:
“No significant trends were found in the risk of pre-term delivery
with increasing consumption either of artificially sweetened drinks
or of sugar-sweetened drinks. Small elevations of risk were observed
with higher consumption of artificially sweetened soft drinks, but
after adjustment for covariates, these reached statistical significance
only when categories of consumption were aggregated to four levels,
and then the odds ratio for the highest category …was only 1.11
(95% CI 1.00-1.24) in comparison with never consumption.…
Associations with sugar-sweetened soft drinks tended to be
somewhat stronger, with an adjusted odds ratio of 1.25 (95% CI
1.08-1.45) for consumption of at least one serving per day.”68
EFSA Panel concludes its comments on both Halldorsson et al and Englund-Ögge,
et al:
“In summary, both studies appear to have been well designed and
conducted. Noting this, the Panel concluded that even at high level of
exposure to artificially sweetened soft drinks the risk of pre-term
delivery is likely to be small, if any. This observation could be a
consequence of uncontrolled residual confounding, and the
inconsistencies in the patterns of association reinforce this uncertainty.
When findings from the two studies are considered together, they do
not point to a hazard concerning the intake of artificially sweetened
soft drinks.”69
Those comments are puzzling. In point of fact the findings of the Englund-
Ögge, et al study do support those of Hallsorsson et al. The panel may deem
the magnitude of an effect to be ‘small’, but without indicating how many
babies would need to be delivered prematurely before the panel might
acknowledging a risk or even a hazard. When remarking that the observed
increased risk: “…could be a consequence of uncontrolled residual
confounding…” the panel invoked an opportunistic hypothesis, but without
67 Page 87 lines 3085-8
68 Pages 87-8, lines 3110-8
69 Page 88, lines 3126-31
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providing any supporting evidence. They might have been diminished by
‘residual confounding, but then they might not. A mention of the possibility
does not justify assuming a probability. The fact that these studies compared
sugar-sweetened drinks with artificially sweetened drinks, rather than
aspartame-sweetened drinks, complicates their interpretation, but aspartame
dominates the artificially sweetened soft drink market, so it does not put
aspartame in the clear.
21. Schernhammer et al., 201270
The panel explains that in their publicly-funded research Schernhammer and
colleagues studied:
“The risk of lymphatic and haematopoietic cancers in relation to
consumption of diet soda and aspartame sweeteners added at the table
was examined in two US cohorts – one of 77,218 female registered
nurses and one of 47,810 male health professionals – followed
prospectively from 1984 and 1986 to 2006…During follow-up, 1,324
subjects developed non-Hodgkin lymphoma (NHL), 285 multiple
myeloma, and 339 leukaemia…After adjustment for potential
confounders, the category of highest aspartame intake…was associated
with a significantly elevated relative risk of NHL (1.64, 95%CI 1.17-
2.29) and of multiple myeloma (3.36, 95%CI 1.38-8.19) in men.
However, there was no consistent trend in risk with increasing
exposure, and there were no corresponding elevations in risk in
women.”71
The Panel acknowledged that:
“Major strengths of this study are its prospective design, the
substantial number of cancer cases, the repeated assessment of dietary
intake and the fact that various potential confounders were addressed.
However, the positive findings can be given little weight, given their
limitation to men, the small relative risks observed, and the lack of
clear dose-response relationships.”72
Once again the comments disparage positive findings. Why might an increased
cancer risk to men not count unless it is also matched by one to women? Cancers
are not always gender-blind. How large would the extra risk need to be before the
panel took it seriously? The panel never says. Some might ask, why might one
extra case of cancer not be one too many?
70 Schernhammer ES, Bertrand KA, Birmann BM, Sampson L, Willett WW and Feskanich D,
‘Consumption of artificial sweetener- and sugar-containing soda and risk of lymphoma and
leukemia in men and women’, American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 2-12, 96, 1419-1428.
71 Panel draft, page 89-90 lines 3202-3218
72 Page 90 lines 3222-3225
41
Perhaps the panel is making unacknowledged assumptions about the putative
benefits of consuming artificial sweeteners, but such assumptions would also
deserve to be critically scrutinised. As the consumption of artificial sweeteners
has grown, especially since aspartame was first marketed in the early 1980s, there
has been no corresponding decline in sugar consumption; in practice and in
aggregate artificial sweeteners do not substitute for sugar consumption, they
supplement it. There is moreover no convincing evidence that they help people
lose weight, and even some evidence suggestion that they may be appetite
stimulants. So the two questions at the end of the previous paragraph deserve to
be answered explicitly.
22. E23 197273
One of the many early studies conducted by, or for, G D Searle (referred to by
Searle, NutraSweet, Ajinomoto and the Panel as E23) examined how normal
adults tolerated aspartame, in the short-term.74 According to the panel:
“In preliminary studies…31 men and 38 non-pregnant women (age 21-45
years) were administered aspartame under double blind conditions in
capsules containing placebo, 200 mg aspartame or 300 mg aspartame. The
subjects took an appropriate number of capsules per day to deliver increasing
doses of aspartame”
To which EFSA says:
“The only ‘adverse’ symptoms reported were mild and often
contradictory (loose stools/constipation, increased/decreased appetite
and headache).”75
The panel provides no explanation of why it surrounds ‘adverse’ with inverted
commas. In what sense are headaches, constipation, laxation or appetite changes
not adverse? The casual manner in which the panel discounts such effects is
important because neurological effects, such as headaches, are amongst the acute
adverse effects that have subsequently most often been reported as attributable to
aspartame consumption. Moreover similar symptoms appeared in E6076, although
once again they were discounted by GD Searle and are by the panel.
Evidence that aspartame can cause headaches has been provided by double-blind
crossover trails.77 While the panel briefly discusses the study by Van den Eeden et
73 Short Term Tolerance Of Aspartame By Normal Adults, 1972, listed by panel page 142
74 Page 90-1 lines 3243-3256
75 Page 93 lines 3255-6
76 Page 91 lines 3269-81
77 S. K. Van Den Eeden et al ‘Aspartame ingestion and headaches: A randomized crossover trial’,
Neurology, October 1994, Vol. 44 no. 10 1787
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al.78 the findings are discounted because: “The Panel consider that with such a low
number of participants it was not possible to draw a conclusion.”79
But the number of subjects enrolled by Van den Eeden and colleagues was deemed
too small, even though it was a similar order of magnitude to those enrolled for
E23. (Further comments on the panel’s treatment of Van den Eeden are given
below under item number 25; see also item 24, ie Koehler and Glaros 1988 below)
The panel evidently assumes that small numbers can suffice if studies provide
negative indications but not if they are positive. In other words, this example
provides further evidence of the panel adopting asymmetric criteria of
interpretation, bias in favour of the compound.
23. Camfield et al, 199280
Camfield and colleagues conducted a non-commercially funded double-blind
study that involved challenging recently diagnosed epileptic children with
aspartame; they reported that aspartame exacerbates symptoms in children with
‘generalized absence epilepsy’: The panel reported that:
“A double-blind study was undertaken in children recently diagnosed
with generalised absence seizures or also called petit mal seizures to
ascertain whether aspartame would exacerbate the occurrence of such
seizures…After…breakfast…children (n = 10) drank orange juice
sweetened with either aspartame (40 mg/kg bw) or sucrose (1 g
sucrose for every 25 mg aspartame) to achieve similar sweetness. For
six hours following consumption of the juice the number and length of
spike-wave bursts, indicative of an absence seizure, were
determined…Each child was tested once with each substance, on two
consecutive days, treatments were assigned in a random fashion. No
information was provided regarding whether lunch or snacks were
given. There were no significant differences in either the frequency or
duration of spike-wave bursts; however, when the two factors were
combined, the total time spent in spike-wave per hour of observation
was significantly higher in children after consumption of aspartame
compared with sucrose…”81
EFSA Panel remarked that the:
“…combination of the two factors into a single measure was not
adequately explained, [But not unreasonable as both matter] and
78 Page 97 lines 3555-67
79 Page 97 lines 3555-67
80 Camfield, P R et al, ‘Aspartame exacerbates EEG spike-wave discharge in children with
generalized absence epilepsy: A double-blind controlled study', Neurology 42, May 1992, p 1000-3
81 Sec 3.2.7.5. pages 95-6 lines 3493-3505
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lack of control of food and drink intake before and after dosing
may have affected the results.”82
Camfield and colleagues might have provided more information about the
provision of lunch and/or snacks, but then the panel could have asked them for it.
It is in any case very unlikely that they would not have provided the children with
food, or that the food contained much in the way of either sugar or aspartame.
The journal in which the paper was published is peer-reviewed and it would be
odd if those matters had not been considered, even if there might not have been
space for those details in the published paper. The panel was also puzzled by the
choice of indicator, although that too might have been the subject of a request for
more data. It is striking however that when experimental indicators fail to suggest
adverse effects from aspartame consumption, the panel never questions their
suitability or relevance. The panel neglects to acknowledge that effects arising in
double-blind challenge studies deserve to be taken particularly seriously,
especially as the panel accept apparently negative studies that were not double-
blind.
24. Koehler and Glaros (1988)83
Koehler and colleagues also provided a interesting non-commercially-funded
double-blind crossover study on the effect of aspartame consumption amongst a
sample of migraine sufferers. The panel reports that:
“…volunteers who suffered with migraines and stayed in their normal
environments during a double-blind crossover study with three phases:
a 4-week baseline phase and two four-week experimental phases, with
a 1-week washout phase between treatments. Participants (two males,
eight females; ages 18 to 47 years) consumed capsules of aspartame
(300 mg) or placebo (microcrystalline cellulose) and self-recorded
incidence of headaches and dietary information. The incidence of
headaches did not differ from baseline during the placebo phase. Five
of the eleven participants reported a higher number of migraines
during the aspartame phase compared to during the baseline or placebo
phases. The mean number of headaches reported was 1.72, 1.55, and
3.55 during the baseline, placebo, and aspartame phases,
respectively.”84
In other words, even in a small sample, there was a conspicuous increase in
headaches in over half of the sample following aspartame ingestion, even
though the subjects did not know what and when they were ingesting. The
panel endeavours to discount the findings by remarking that: “No
82 Page 96 lines 3505-7
83 Koehler SM, Glaros A, ‘The Effect of Aspartame on Migraine Headache’, Headache, 1988, Vol
28 pp 10-13
84 Page 96 lines 3536-4
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differences were reported in the intensity or duration of migraine
headaches.”85As if that was a decisive or even relevant consideration.
The panel cites a high dropout rate, from 25 to 11 participants, as making
interpretation of the results difficult, but if small sample numbers can be
sufficient for negative results to be endorsed it is not clear why they need be
higher before positive findings deserve not to be discounted. One
explanation for the dropout rate might well be because the participants
judged that the headaches that they experienced were so unpleasant that they
were unwilling to remain in the study and endure the suffering. The panel
neglected however to discuss such a possibility.
25. Van der Eeden et al86
Van Den Eeden and colleagues conducted a randomised crossover trial of the
effect of aspartame consumption on headache sufferers. The panel states:
“…a double-blind randomised crossover trial with 32 subjects self-
diagnosed as sensitive to aspartame. Only 18 participants completed
the full protocol, as other subjects withdrew for various reasons
including adverse effects. Subjects took capsules containing either
aspartame or placebo (microcrystalline cellulose) three times a day to
achieve a dose of 30 mg/kg bw/day for seven days. A significantly
higher (p = 0.04) occurrence of self-reported headaches was recorded
following exposure to aspartame (33% of days) compared to placebo
(24% of days).”87
The panel responded with:
“The subjects who had excess headaches following aspartame dosing
were those who had, at the beginning of the study, indicated they
were ‘very sure’ that they were susceptible to aspartame-induced
headaches. In contrast, those subjects who classified themselves as
‘somewhat or not sure’ reported similar headache incidence during
aspartame and placebo exposure periods. The authors conclude that
these results indicated that a small subset of the population was
susceptible to aspartame-induced headaches…The Panel consider
that with such a low number of participants it was not possible to
draw a conclusion.”88
Once again, low numbers are invoked not as grounds for a hypothesis that there
may well be a problem, or as a prompt to request further studies, but as grounds
for dismissing the data as if a ‘false positive’. Nor does the panel explain why low
85 Page 96 Lines 3545-7
86 Van Den Eeden SK, Koepsell TD, Langstreth WT Jr, et al., ‘Aspartame Ingestion and
Headaches: A randomized Crossover Trial’. Neurology, 1994; 44(10):1787-93
87 Page 97 lines 3555-67
88 Page 97 lines 3560-67
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numbers do not count against apparently negative studies that used similarly small
numbers. The panel notes (line 3568) in relation to the set of studies concerning
headaches that there is: “…no convincing evidence of effects of aspartame on
headache.” But the panel fails to provide any indication as to what it would take
to convince them. Perhaps nothing short of ‘knock-down causal proof’ would be
sufficient, as evidence from several double-blind studies is apparently insufficient.
Maybe the panel would only be persuaded if headaches always and only occurred
immediately after aspartame consumption? It is in any case clear that the barrier
that apparently positive evidence would need to cross is exceptionally high, and
far higher than that deemed essential for apparently negative findings.
26 and 27: Jacob and Stechschulte, 200889, Hill and Belsito 200390
The panel referred to these two studies and reported:
“…some case reports have been published in which associations are
made between aspartame intakes, in particular the subsequent
exposure to the aspartame metabolite formaldehyde, and Type IV
Delayed Type Hypersensitivity (DTH) reactions in patients with
proven contact sensitization to formaldehyde.”91
EFSA responded (lines 3609-12) with:
“However, it is not possible to establish the associations observed in
these two case studies with only a limited number of patients, larger
case studies are needed with double-blind placebo-controlled
challenges using aspartame and placebo exposures, and should include
well-defined control patient groups.”
Curiously enough, however, the panel neglects to request those larger studies, nor
does it suspend judgement pending the receipt of the results of such studies, it
simply interprets the absence of proof as if it constituted proof of absence. That
may be an all-too-familiar tactic, but it is hardly sound science.
Summary
This section has discussed 27 examples of where the EFSA panel has discounted
apparently positive findings of adverse effects of aspartame. In every case they
have been discounted as, in effect, falling short of providing conclusive proof. On
the other hand, in every one of the 27 cases, the grounds provided by the panel
were also inconclusive, frequently arbitrary and occasionally spurious; in general
they are simply flimsy. The panel did not accept any positive finding as a true
positive, every single one was characterised as probably or definitely a false
positive. The fact is that all those 27 studies providing evidence positively
89 Jacob SE and Stechschulte S, ‘Formaldehyde, aspartame, and migraines: a possible connection’,
Dermatitis, 2008, 19, E10-11
90 Hill AM and Belsito DV, ‘Systemic contact dermatitis of the eyelids caused by formaldehyde
derived from aspartame?’ Contact Dermatitis, 2003, 49, 258-259
91 Page 98 lines 3606-12
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indicating adverse effects were funded by non-commercial sources; it is distinctly
unscientific to suppose that commercially funded studies are intrinsically more
reliable than independent studies.
It would be misleading to suggest that all non-commercially funded on the safety
of aspartame have yielded apparently positive evidence of adverse effects. It is
therefore worth noting that two examples of apparently negative non-
commercially funded studies are provided by:
1. Gallus S, Scotti L, Negri E, Talamini R, Franceschi S, Montella M,
Giacosa A, Dal Maso L and La Vecchia C, 2006. ‘Artificial sweeteners and
cancer risk in a network of case-control studies’ Annals of Oncology, 18,
40-44; and
2. Lim U, Subar AF, Mouw T, Hartge P, Morton LM, Stolzenberg-Solomon
R, Campbell, D, Hollenbeck AR and Schatzkin A, 2006. ‘Consumption of
aspartame-containing beverages and incidence of hematopoietic and brain
malignancies’ Cancer Epidemiology, Biomarkers and Prevention, 15,
1654-1659.
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Responding to apparently ‘negative’ studies
This briefer section examines several of the occasions on which the panel rejected
apparently ‘negative’ studies, and does so in the sequence in which they are
discussed in the panel’s draft. As suggested above, the dominant interpretative
pattern revealed by the panel’s draft includes an implicit rule to take apparently
‘negative’ studies at face value, rather than subjecting them to penetrating
criticisms. There are, nonetheless a few exceptions, which deserve to be
discussed here, where the studies were so poor that it was evident that no reliance
could be placed on them.
A list of 8 examples where the panel discounts possible negatives as unreliable
include the following items:
Study ID Year
reported
Location of panel comments
G D Searle’s E81 1974 Page 61 lines 1829-1837
G D Searle’s E12 1970 Page 61 lines 1855-1861
G D Searle’s E44 1972 Page 61 lines 1862-1870
Rencuzogullari et al 2004 Page 62, lines 1880-4
Bandyopadhyay et al 2008 Page 62 lines1885-90
Durnev et al 1995 Pages 62-3 Lines 1909-22
Mukhopadhyay et al 2000 Page 63, lines 1923-8
Cabaniols et al 2011 Page 89, lines 3195-3201
While on those 8 occasions, the panel commented adversely on apparently
negative studies, there were also other 8 occasions when the panel failed to
criticise the shortcomings of apparently negative studies, apart from those the 15
studies that were deemed pivotal and flawed by the FDA in the early 1970s.
One example is provided in the discussion of one of G D Searle’s very earliest
studies, identified as E3, 1972:
“In a sub-acute study, aspartame was given in the diet for 4 weeks to
male and female Charles River CD rats (E3, 1972). Seven-week-old
rats (5 animals per dose group) were administered aspartame
incorporated in the diet on a w/w basis, resulting in an exposure of 0,
2000, 4000 or 10000 mg/kg bw/day. Actual consumption was
estimated to be within 10% of the proposed dose. No consistent
statistically significant effect in body weight was observed, though a
significant decrease in feed consumption was reported in the high-
dose females at weeks 2 and 3; however, this was not reflected in
body weight gain, which increased during the treatment-period. No
adverse clinical conditions were reported during the study period
and 100% survival was reported in both control and treated groups.
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Only five control animals (3 males and 2 females) and the animals
from the high-dose groups were examined histopathologically. No
treatment-related changes were reported except that the intestinal
mucosa from the treated rats was heavily coated with a clear,
moderately viscous fluid.”92 (emphasis added)
Given that the number of animals per dose group was just 5, the remark that there
were ‘no consistent statistically significant effects’ is unpersuasive. Given the
normal criterion for statistical significance, namely less than 1 chance in 20 of the
change having been a random occurrence, 4 out of the 5 rats could have been
adversely effected, and that pattern would still fall short of ‘statistical
significance’.
This study, given its small size, when interpreted in terms of statistical
significance was bound to be irremediably insensitive. Moreover, as “…only…3
males and 2 females…from the high-dose groups were examined
histopathologically…” the resulting histopathological data should have been
discounted as uninformative. In this case however, an apparent negative was
reported by the panel as if a reliably true negative when at best the study was
conspicuously un-illuminating and quite possibly provided a false negative. This is
an example of where the panel accepted a homeopathic dose of apparently
negative data as if unproblematically reliable, while (as explained in the previous
section) discounting a substantial weight of apparently positive evidence.
The evidence provided by the dossier of documents I delivered to EFSA in the
autumn of 2011 shows that none of the studies submitted for review by the US
FDA Bureau of Foods Task Force, namely: E-5, E-77/78, E-89 and those that were
submitted for review by the UAREP, namely: E-9, E-11, E-19, E-28, E-33/34, E-
70, E-75/76, E-86/87, E-88 and E-90 should be treated as if they were reliable.
While the conclusions of the Bureau of Foods Task Force and of the UAREP
perversely portrayed the shortcomings of those studies as providing insufficient
grounds for discounting them, both of those exercises have subsequently been
irredeemably repudiated by key protagonists who were involved in those
exercises.
In particular statements by Dr Jacqueline Verrett, which are on the record and
published, including her testimony to the US Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, 3 November 1987, show that the terms of reference imposed
on the Bureau of Foods Task Force were inappropriately narrow, and framed to
prevent the taskforce from addressing the most critical failings of the studies.
Similarly, a critique of the UAREP Report provided by Dr Adrian Gross, a former
FDA pathologist, in his letters to Senator Metzenbaum, which were included in the
record of the US Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 3 November
92 Page 59 lines 1742-52
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1987.93 Gross explained that the terms of reference adopted for the UAREP
review, and chosen by G D Searle and a senior FDA official (who subsequently
took a leading role in a soft drinks industry trade association) were also
inappropriately narrow, and framed to prevent UAREP pathologists from
addressing the most critical failings of the studies, from which pathology samples
were reviewed. As Gross repeatedly explained, the UAREP panel failed to
examine critically the practices that had resulted in those samples being mounted
on the pathology slides.
A few conspicuous examples of the panel reviewing the problematic early Searle
studies and interpreting them uncritically, while failing to address their
shortcoming are provided by the discussion of:
Study ID Year
reported
Location of panel comments
G D Searle’s E75 1974 Page 65 lines 2030 – 2062
G D Searle’s E33/34 1974 Page 66 lines 2063-2105
G D Searle’s E70 1974 Page 66-7 lines 2106-2161 and
on page 68 lines 2175-83
It is noteworthy that in relation to E70 the panel comments:
“…Some statistically significant changes in relative organ weights
were reported but these were not accompanied by histopathological
alterations and these were therefore considered by the authors to be of
no biological significance.”94
While the authors of the study may have preferred to treat those statistically
significant changes as toxicologically insignificant, it is less clear why the panel
chose uncritically adopted that interpretation.
Another set of examples of where the panel fails to criticise the shortcoming of
putative false negatives comes in Section 3.2.5.2.2 on developmental studies.95 At
three points in that brief section the panel refers to ‘negative geotaxis’ in studies as
if it was relevant and as if its absence provided some reassurance.96 The panel
failed however to refer to work such as that by B A Motz & J R Alberts, ‘The
validity and utility of geotaxis in young rodents’, in Neurotoxicology and
Teratology, 2005, Vol 27, pp 529 – 533, who argued that in infant rodents
‘negative geotaxis’ is a spurious indicator with no reliable validity.
When discussing Holder (1989), the panel reports97 that the study used only 10
rats per group, but then treated the resultant data as sufficient to confirm the
93 Available as http://www.dorway.com/gross.txt
94 Page 67 lines 2121-3
95 pages 80-81 lines 2750-2787
96 See Mahalik and Gautieri (1984) & McAnulty et al. (1989) & Holder (1989)
97 Pages 80-81 lines 2772-2787
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absence of the endpoints that had been monitored. The panel would have
displayed greater scientific rigour if it had drawn attention to the lack of sensitivity
of a test using such small groups. A putative false negative was yet again
exempted from even the most rudimentary criticism.
When discussing Searle’s 1972 study known as E23, the panel remarks:
“In preliminary studies...31 men and 38 non-pregnant women (age
21-45 years) were administered aspartame under double blind
conditions in capsules containing placebo, 200 mg aspartame or 300
mg aspartame. The subjects took an appropriate number of capsules
per day to deliver increasing doses of aspartame”98
The panel then reports that: “The only ‘adverse’ symptoms reported were mild and
often contradictory (loose stools/constipation, increased/decreased appetite and
headache).”99 The panel fails to explain why it surrounded the word adverse with
inverted commas; why might those effects not be deemed adverse? This issue is
important because once aspartame entered the food supply those symptoms and
adverse effects are precisely the ones that have most frequently been reported by
consumers. Moreover the same symptoms are reported in respect of E23100 and
E60101, but yet again the evidence of those adverse effects was discounted G D
Searle in and since the 1970s, and in this draft by the EFSA panel.
The panel represented G D Searle’s 1972 study known as E 43, as providing
evidence that:
“…aspartame was not mutagenic. The Panel considered that the
methods implemented were sufficiently robust to support the results
reported, but considered the study limited since mitotic indexes were
not reported”102
This is a example of when an apparent negative from small study is treated not just
as negative, but as showing that aspartame is not mutagenic –without qualification.
That must be contrasted with the occasions, discussed above, when apparently
positive evidence of adverse effects in small studies was discounted because of the
small sample size.
98 Pages 90-1 lines 3243-3256
99 Page 91 lines 3255-6
100 Page 91 lines 3257-68
101 Page 91 lines 3269-81
102 Page 61 lines 1847-1854
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Summary of implicit and unacknowledged criteria of interpretation for bopth
‘positive’ and ‘negative studies
The detailed discussions above demonstrate that the panel implicitly adopted a
skewed and biased set of interpretative criteria. The criteria of interpretation of
apparently positive studies were deployed in ways that allowed the panel to
dismiss every single one of them, as if false positives. In relation to apparently
negative studies the panel deemed at least 80 of them to be unproblematically
reliable, ie as true negatives. And while it did discount several apparently negative
studies as unreliable, it did so only on a handful of occasions. Moreover, even
when discussing evidently inadequate studies that were apparently negative, the
panel often failed to comment on their shortcomings, and chose instead to treat
them as if they were reliable, as if true negatives.
Moreover, that skewed pattern of interpretation is especially puzzling when notice
is taken of the fact that almost all apparently negative studies were funded by
organisations with vested commercial interests and every single one of the positive
studies were non-commercially funded. That pattern undermines the panel’s claim
that its judgements are based on and only on scientific evidence. If they had been,
its conclusion would have been very different.
Of course none of the studies, whether positive or negative, are perfect; all studies
are characterised by some imperfections. What is striking about the panel’s
treatment of the negative and positive studies is that it unremittingly highlights and
criticises the shortcomings of all the positive studies, often invoking guesswork
rather than evidence, yet generously neglecting or forgiving almost all of the
shortcomings of the negative studies.
This pattern raises a crucial question about whether or not the members of the
panel were sufficiently neutral and open-minded, or whether the criteria of
inclusion and interpretations might have been biased.
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The following tabulation indicates the membership of the panel, and whether or not evidence of possible conflicts of interest is
available.
Name of panel
members
Focus of possible
conflict in interest:
Commercial or
Institutional
Evidential source
Fernando Aguilar Nestle -
commercial
Corporate Europe Observatory
http://corporateeurope.org/
15 June 2011
Riccardo Crebelli ILSI - commercial Corporate Europe Observatory,
http://corporateeurope.org/
13 Sept 2011
Birgit Dusemund Member of WG
'Ramazzini Institute
study on aspartame
- institutional
https://ess.efsa.europa.eu/doi/doiweb/panel/CEF/wg/
460523
Pierre Galtier Member of WG
'Ramazzini Institute
study on aspartame
- institutional
https://ess.efsa.europa.eu/doi/doiweb/panel/CEF/wg/
460523
David Gott Member of the
Secretariat of the
Committee on
Toxicity -
institutional
https://ess.efsa.europa.eu/doi/doiweb/panel/CEF/wg/
460523
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Ursula Gundert-
Remy
ILSI - commercial Corporate Europe Observatory,
http://corporateeurope.org/
13 Sept 2011
Jürgen Koenig ILSI - commercial Corporate Europe Observatory,
http://corporateeurope.org/
15 June 2011
Claude Lambré Member of WG
'Ramazzini Institute
study on aspartame
- institutional
https://ess.efsa.europa.eu/doi/doiweb/panel/CEF/wg/
460523
Jean-Charles
Leblanc
Member of ILSI
working group
2006 to 2009 -
commercial
CEO 15 June 2011, http://corporateeurope.org/ and
http://corporateeurope.org/print/publications/open-
letter-ceo-european-food-safety-authority
Alicja Mortensen Chair of ad hoc
WG ‘Ramazzini
Institute study on
aspartame in mice
and methanol’ -
institutional
https://ess.efsa.europa.eu/doi/doiweb/panel/CEF/wg/
460523
Pasquale Mosesso none
Dominique Parent-
Massin
Coca Cola -
commercial
Corporate Europe Observatory,
http://corporateeurope.org/
15 June 2011
Cf Conference "entretiens de bichat" in workshop
organised by the communication agency "proteine"
on behalf of coca cola on "actuality in food safety of
sweeteners"
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Ivan Stankovic none
Paul Tobback ILSI - commercial Corporate Europe Observatory,
http://corporateeurope.org/
15 June 2011
Ine Waalkens-
Berendsen
none
Rudolf Antonius
Woutersen
Expert - WG
'Ramazzini Institute
study on aspartame
in mice and
methanol' -
institutional
Source https://ess.efsa.europa.eu/doi/doiweb/panel/CEF/wg/460523
Matthew Wright none
The information in that table indicates that of the 17 members of the panel, only 4 are not characterised by some relevant conflicts of
interest. 7 members of the panel have commercial conflicts of interest, as they do work, or have worked, with commercial
organisations with direct commercial interests in aspartame. Furthermore, 6 members of the panel are now employed in, or have been
employed by, regulatory institutions that have published documents asserting the safety of aspartame, during the course of their
employment; they are therefore characterised by institutional conflicts of interest.
Moreover, Dr Lesley Stanley, who was contracted by EFSA to conduct ‘preparatory work for the re-evaluation of aspartame’, was a
member of the UK’s Committee on Toxicity (CoT) from 2001 to 2007, reported to the CoT on the papers published by the Ramazzini
Foundation. , (COC/06/S2 – December 2006 Available as
http://www.iacoc.org.uk/statements/documents/COC06S2AspartamestatementDec2006_000.pdf )
Professor of Science Policy SPRU
Freeman Centre
University of Sussex,
Brighton BN1 9SL
T +44(0) 1273 877380
F +44(0) 1273 685865
e.p.millstone@sussex.ac.uk
www.sussex.ac.uk
Conclusion:
The analysis provided in and substantiated by this report has revealed that with a very few
exceptions, almost all studies that have been reported as suggesting that aspartame poses
no risks to human health have been treated buy the panel as if robust and reliable by the
EFSA panel, while all (ie 100%) of the studies that suggest that consuming aspartame may
pose a risk to health were deemed by the panel to be unreliable.
The EFSA panel has portrayed all the apparently positive findings as false positives, most
frequently by reference to opportunistic hypotheses rather than by reference to relevant
empirical evidence. By contrast the panel has been almost entirely blind to possible false
negatives.
The only way in which the conclusion of this report can be sustained, namely that
aspartame is unproblematically safe, is firstly by assuming that all apparently ‘positive’
studies are unreliable, even though none were commercially funded, secondly that all the
apparently negative studies are entirely reliable, despite the fact that almost all of which
were commercially funded, and thirdly that conflicts of interest are inconsequential. Those
three assumptions are however implausible, perverse and unscientific.
EFSA should therefore discount the entire draft report, and convene a new panel composed
only of experts who are entirely free of any conflicts of interest, and its work should be
supported only by individuals who have no conflicts of interest. The new panel should be
asked to review all the evidence, not just some of it, and in way that prioritises the
protection of consumer and public health over any commercial or industrial considerations.
The European Commission and the European Parliament should also take responsibility for
ensuring that EFSA acts properly to protect consumers rather than assisting the food and
chemical industries.
Moreover the European Commission and the European Parliament should meet their
responsibilities by ensuring that EFSA acts properly to protect consumers rather than
helping the food and chemical industries.
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Appendix 1
The following table identifies each of the 30 documents in the dossier I delivered to the
EFSA in the autumn of 2011, and outlines what they show.
1 Additives: A Guide for Everyone (Penguin Books): Erik Millstone: 1988 Excerpt
This document summarises my research into the toxicological and regulatory history of
aspartame, as of 1988, and outlines numerous concerns about the safety of aspartame.
2 Paper published in The Ecologist: Erik Millstone: 1994
Several serious concerns about the safety and approval of aspartame were elaborated in this
paper.
3 Chronology: US Senator Howard Metzenbaum’s staff: 1986 with subsequent elaborations
This is a chronology of some of the main events in the scientific, regulatory and commercial
history of aspartame. It highlights key events in the process whereby unreliable evidence came
to be submitted, and then accepted by the US regulatory authorities.
4 Who’s Who: Senator Howard Metzenbaum’s staff: 1986
Prepared in connection with the failure of the Chicago Federal Attorney’s office to convene a
Grand Jury to indict G D Searle – the firm that developed aspartame and that gained consent
for it to be marketed.
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5 List of documents about the G D Searle testing and approval process:
Senator Howard Metzenbaum’s staff: 1986
This list indicates the thoroughness with which Metzenbaum’s team detailed the shortcomings
in the testing and approval processes of aspartame in the USA. Since subsequently the UK,
EC/EU and the JECFA all relied on US data, and presumed the adequacy of those data and the
review of them by the US authorities, they too suffer from identical problems.
Observations
The scandal about the short-comings in the conduct and reporting of test on aspartame was
first uncovered by scientists from the FDA’s drug control division. The FDA decided to
investigate Aspartame after one of its leading pathologists, Dr Adrian Gross, noticed what he
thought was a worrying anomaly in a Searle report on a pharmaceutical product, Flagyl; the
summary at the start of Searle’s submission did not accurately reflect the detailed data
presented in subsequent chapters. The report was returned by Gross to Searle in the
expectation that it would be re-submitted with the summary revised to fit the data. Gross was
surprised when a fresh submission arrived with data altered to fit the summary!
In response, officials from the FDA’s Drugs Division made an unannounced investigative visit
to Searle’s offices and laboratories. In the course of the FDA’s investigation questions were
raised about the conduct and reporting of tests on the safety of Aspartame: as with Flagyl, the
documents submitted by Searle did not accurately represent the conduct of the experiments
which they were supposed to be reporting, and consequently may have underestimated the
toxicity of the sweetener. In response the FDA established two Special Task Forces; one
under the auspices of the Bureau of Drugs reviewed Searle’s safety evaluations of their
pharmaceutical products, while the second under the Bureau of Foods, examined Aspartame.
6 Studies in support of safety of aspartame: NutraSweet company: undated, obtained
from G D Searle’s London representatives in 1987
This document lists all the studies whose data were provided to the UK and US governments
(and presumably to JECFA and the SCF too) in support of aspartame. It shows that the key
studies whose validity is in question were included in Searle’s original dossier.
58
7 Establishment Investigation Report (EIR): FDA’s initial Searle Task Force: 18 February
1978
This covers several studies conducted with aspartame under contract to Searle by
Hazleton Laboratories Inc. based in Virginia.
Observations
Study E77/78 30 serious errors noted in the conduct and reporting of that
study.
Study E32 21 serious errors noted
Study E28 14 serious errors noted
Study E27/35 16 serious errors noted including (p10):
Observation for drug effect records are inconsistent
Records for hamster No. N9LM indicate this animal
was not alive on October 23 1970, was alive on November
20, was not alive on December 18 and January 15 1971,
was alive February 12, and was found dead on February 25
It is difficult to see how any reliance can be placed on studies that have been so poorly
conducted and reported.
8 Final Report: FDA’s Bureau of Drugs Searle Task Force: 24 March 1976
This reviews serious inadequacies in the general conduct of toxicity tests, conducted
both by Searle and by a sub-contractor Hazleton Laboratories.
Observations
“At the heart of FDA’s regulatory process is its ability to rely upon the integrity of the
basic safety data submitted by sponsors of the regulated products. Our investigation
clearly demonstrates that, in the case of the G.D. Searle Company, we have no basis
for such reliance now…Through our efforts, we have uncovered serious deficiencies
in Searle’s operations and practices which undermine the basis for reliance on Searle’s
integrity in conducting high quality animal research to accurately determine or
characterise the toxic potential of its products.” (page 1)
Under Recommendation #1 the report states: “…the Bureau of Foods should make a
determination on the disposition of the Aspartame studies currently under official
FDA seal at Searle and Hazleton Laboratories.” (page 8)
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9 Memo on reviewing aspartame studies: Dr Adrian Gross, US FDA: 4 November 1976
available at http://www.dorway.com/gross1.html
This is a memo from Dr Adrian Gross of the US FDA to one of his superiors, Carlton Sharp,
concerning the FDA’s intention to contract out to the Universities Associated for Research
and Education in Pathology Inc (or UAREP) the responsibility for reviewing 12 of the 15
safety studies on aspartame that the initial FDA investigation had indicated were problematic.
The memo indicates that Gross doubted that the UAREP had the relevant expertise, and that
he doubted the wisdom of having G D Searle pay for the UAREP’s work. He was concerned
that G D Searle might influence the conduct and reporting of the UAREP’s work. In the
event, Gross’s concerns turned out to be well-grounded. The first few pages, including the
Table of Contents, of the UAREP report appear as item 15 in the current dossier.
Observations
The memo shows that not only were the tests on aspartame unreliable, but that serious
questions arise in connection with the steps taken by the FDA ostensibly to ‘validate’
the Searle studies.
10 Letter from Richard Merrill, then FDA’s Chief Counsel in Washington, to Samuel
Skinner, then US Federal Attorney in Chicago: 10 January 1977 (the discussion of
aspartame starts on page 17)
Richard Merrill instructs Samuel Skinner to convene a Grand Jury to investigate
Searle’s conduct in respect of both aspartame and aldactone.
Observations
The eventual failure of Skinner and his colleagues to convene a Grand Jury, because
the Statute of Limitations expired, was a crucial step and institutional failure in the
aspartame saga.
11 Internal memo from Samuel Skinner to his subordinates: 8 March 1977
Skinner indicates that he has decided to recuse (i.e. excuse) himself from the Searle
investigation because he had been invited to join the law firm Sidley and Austin, which was
representing G D Searle.
Observations
Under those circumstances Skinner had no choice but to withdraw from the Searle
investigation, but the development contributed to delays that eventually resulted in the
time limit set under the Statute of Limitations expiring before the next stage of due
process could be completed.
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12 Bressler Report – first part: 18 July 1977
An Establishment Investigation Report (EIR) covering the period from 2 March 1977 to 8 July
1977 that documents in great detail serious inadequacies in two of the studies (E5 and E89)
conducted on aspartame, both intended to evaluate the embryotoxicity and teratogenic
potential of aspartame when administered orally to albino rats (E5) and to mice (E89).
Observations
Establishment Investigation Reports were a tool developed by the FDA, before the
rules on Good Laboratory Practice were established, if serious concerns were raised
about the ways in which experiments had been conducted and/or reported.
13 Bressler Report – second part: 15 August 1977
available at http://www.dorway.com/bressler.txt
An Establishment Investigation Report (EIR) that documents in great detail the serious
inadequacies in a pivotal test on DKP (diketopiperazine), which is one of aspartame’s
breakdown products.
Establishment Investigation Reports were then a tool developed by the FDA, before
the rules on Good Laboratory Practice were established, if serious concerns were
raised about the ways in which experiments had been conducted and/or reported.
Observations
The study in question (PD 988S73, SC-19192) was a 115 week rodent oral
carcinogenicity study on diketopiperazine, a decomposition product of aspartame.
The main findings of the 77 page EIR are summarised in Appendix 1 below.
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14 Internal FDA memo from the Bureau of Foods Task Force to the Acting Director
of the FDA Bureau of Foods, Howard R. Roberts: 28 September 1977
Along with its appendices, this memo provides an analysis that was supposed to
summarise the two Bressler Reports. This memo is, however, a curious document
because, despite the numerous problems highlighted by Bressler and his colleagues, it
states on page 3 that: “The differences observed and documented...are not of such a
magnitude that they would significantly alter the conclusions of the studies” and “...the
three studies appear to be authentic.” These conclusions are puzzling because they
gloss over many of the issues raised in, and appear to be inconsistent with many of the
facts recorded in, the two Bressler Reports.
The reason for this apparent anomaly is explained in the quotation from Dr Jacqueline
Verrett that follows.
Observations
In May 1987 Dr Jacqueline Verrett, one of the signatories to the 28 September 1977
memo, provided the following explanation. This is from her statement on the record
at a hearing of the US Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources (3rd
November 1987, item 24, page 383 et seq.)
Her comments explain the divergence between the summary and conclusions of the
Bureau of Foods Task Force Report and the evidence on which it was supposed to
have been based.
“We were limited in what we could actually conclude about the studies. We were not
allowed to comment on the validity of any study. It was an explicit instruction based
on administrative rather than scientific considerations. We were supposed to figure out
what the conclusions would have been if the studies had been fully and correctly
reported. We were obliged to ignore the protocols and the non-homogeneity of the
DKP. [i.e. the Bureau of Food Task Force was instructed to ignore the difference
between the way in which the study was supposed to have been conducted and the
way in which it had actually been conducted and also to ignore the failure to mix the
test compound properly into the feed of the laboratory animals.] The Bressler Report
did show that non-homogeneity. Some animals did reject the DKP. Searle initially said
that it may not have been fully mixed but that that did not matter; they later said that it
had been fully mixed. We were not allowed to consider those issues by the Bureau of
Foods administrator. Our remit was limited to a comparison of the Bressler data
against the original data. We were ham-strung in being able to comment. The fact is
that the studies should not have been considered at all, and that was the position from
the beginning.”
15 UAREP report: Table of contents: 18 November 1977
These are just the first few pages of the 1,062 pages document. An entire copy could be
provided if the FSA finds it difficult otherwise to obtain a copy.
The Table of Contents lists those studies that the UAREP reviewed.
Observations
A critique of the UAREP Report is provided by Dr Adrian Gross, the FDA
pathologist, in his letters to Senator Metzenbaum which are included in the record of
the US Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 3 November 1987. (See
item 25 below, p.430 et seq, especially pages 435 – 6) The texts of those letter are
available at http://www.dorway.com/gross.txt
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16 Two letters from Dr Adrian Gross to Senator Howard Metzenbaum, both dated 3
November 1987, and reproduced in the record of US Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources (item 25 below) available at http://www.dorway.com/gross.txt
These letters discuss, amongst other things, the short-comings of the review by the
UAREP of toxicity studies on aspartame
17 Report of the Public Board of Inquiry (PBOI) into aspartame: 30 September 1980
In 1979, in an attempt to resolve the controversy once and for all, the FDA set up a Public
Board of Inquiry that published its conclusions in October 1980.
Observations
The PBOI confined itself to examining two questions, both relating to Aspartame’s
possible effects on the brain.
On brain damage resulting in mental retardation, it took the view that Aspartame
consumption would not pose an increased risk of mental retardation.
On brain tumours, it concluded (by reference to data from two of the studies examined
by UAREP) that it was unable to rule out the possibility that Aspartame could induce
brain tumours.
Consequently the Board recommended that Aspartame should NOT be permitted for
use, pending the results of further tests.
The conclusion of the document states that “The Board has not been presented with
proof of a reasonable certainty that aspartame is safe for use as a food additive under
its intended conditions of use.” (p. 49)
18 Copy of an internal FDA memo from Robert Condon, an FDA toxicologist: 19 May 1981
Robert Condon explains to his superior why he is not convinced that aspartame had been
shown to be safe in respect of the risk of brain tumours.
Observations
Condon highlighted the postive results in a study (also known as E33/34) in female
rats, inadequacies in the conduct of studies E70 and E78, and the limited power of
those studies. This document was written after the PBOI had reported but before the
then Commissioner at the FDA, A H Hayes, approved aspartame for use in the USA.
It indicates that Hayes did not have the endorsement of some of his staff for his
decision, and indicates why not.
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19 Memo from Dr Douglas Park, a senior FDA toxicologist, to his superior: 19 May 1981
Dr Park argues that the evidence of the brain tumour risk from aspartame was equivocal, but
he explains that the information provided to the PBOI was, in some key respect, inaccurate,
and that the correct information would have reinforced their concerns about the risks that
aspartame consumption could pose. He concluded that aspartame had not been shown to be
safe, and recommended against approval.
Observations
On 15 July 1981, Arthur Hull Hayes, US FDA commissioner, overruled the Public
Board of Inquiry and approved aspartame, initially for dry products, asserting that
aspartame has been shown to be safe.
In September 1983, ex-Commissioner Hayes joined Burston-Marsteller, Searle’s
public relation firm.
On 8 July 1983, Acting FDA commissioner, Mark Novitch, approved aspartame for
use in carbonated beverages.
20 Letter from Professor Richard Wurtman at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to
the New England Journal of Medicine: 18th August 1983 pp. 429 – 430)
Professor Richard Wurtman explains why he expects the introduction of aspartame into soft
drinks to risk provoking a range of adverse neurological symptoms.
21 Senator Howard Metzenbaum’s Nutrasweet Bill: 1 August 1985
This is the Bill that Senator Howard Metzenbaum presented to the US Senate on 1st August
1985. This document provides a careful review of some of the key issues in this extensive
controversy.
22 Senator Metzenbaum’s letter to the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee: 3
February 1986
Senator Metzenbaum sets out his concerns about the conduct of several members of the staff
of the US Federal Attorney’s Office in Chicago in relation to their investigation into Searle’s
affairs and their dealing with Sidley and Austin.
23 Letter from Samuel Molinary, then the Vice President, Regulatory Affairs of the
Nutrasweet Company, to Erik Millstone; 20 April 1987
Samuel Molinary confirms that the three key studies referred to in the Bressler Reports items
12 and 13 had never been repeated. He contended that they did not need to be repeated, but
that is a key issue that this dossier serves to contest.
24 Text of an American newspaper article by Gregory Gordon: 12 October 1987
The article reviews some recently emerged concerns relating to the possible acute toxicity of
aspartame in human consumers.
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25 Cover page and table of contents of the Senate Committee hearings
The whole document is 530 pages long, so this dossier does not provide a copy of the entire
document, although if the EFSA has difficulties gaining access to this material I could assist.
26 Paper by Prof John Olney of Washington University, St Louis and his colleagues in the
Journal of Neuropathology and Experimental Neurology: November 1996
The authors analysed cancer statistics from the US National Cancer Institute covering a
sample of approximately 10% of the US population for the period from 1975 to 1995.
Observations
The authors found that the introduction of aspartame into the USA, into dry goods in 1981 and
soft drinks in 1983, was followed by an abrupt increase in the reported incidence of brain
tumours. The change was most noticeable between 1984 and 1985, and it corresponded to
approximately 1,500 extra cases of brain cancer per year in the USA.
Their second main finding was that there had also been a marked change in the incidence of
particular types of brain tumours, with a reduction in the proportion of a relatively less
aggressive (and often preliminary) type of tumour (astrocytomas) and a sharp increase in the
incidence of a far more aggressive (and all too often terminal) type of tumour (glioblastomas).
The investigators argued that the reported changes in tumour incidence were unlikely to have
been artefacts of improvements in diagnostic technologies. The introduction and rapid
diffusion of computerised tomography in the early to mid- 1970s, and of magnetic resonance
imaging technology in the early to mid-1980s, certainly improved diagnostic precision. But
they contend that the impact of those innovations upon the reported incidence of these central
nervous system (CNS) tumours had fully worked their way through before aspartame was
introduced. Before those imaging technologies were introduced, it was far harder to diagnose
brain cancer. Consequently, it was often not until tumours developed into glioblastomas that
they were diagnosed, and a relatively high portion of tumours at the earlier astrocytoma stage
went undetected. When the imaging technologies were introduced, brain tumours tended to
be detected at the earlier stage, and consequently in the late 1970s the number of reported
astrocytomas went up, while the number of glioblastomas exhibited a corresponding decline.
After aspartame was introduced, however, the opposite pattern can be observed. The
incidence of glioblastomas rose sharply, and starting in the late 1980s the number of
astrocytomas declined even more sharply. Since those latter changes run counter to the
direction which could be attributed to the introduction of better diagnostic technologies, it is
hard to see how the reported changing tumour incidence could be ascribed to innovations in
diagnosis. If the apparent increase in overall incidence had been due to improved
diagnostics, then we should expect a marked change in post-diagnostic survival rates, but no
such change was evident.
Olney and his colleagues suspect aspartame to be implicated in the aetiology of the extra
cases of brain cancer for three main reasons. Firstly, the type of CNS tumour found to be
increasing most rapidly in the USA is the same kind of lesion as was found in one of the
animal studies conducted on aspartame in the 1970s. Secondly Olney and colleagues also
drew attention to the results of a study by Shephard et al published in 1993. (Shephard S. E.
et al, ‘Mutagenic activity of peptides and the artificial sweetener aspartame after nitrosation’,
Food and Chemical Toxicology, 1993, Vol. 31, pp. 323-329) thereby indicating a biochemical
mechanism that could account for a tumourogenic effect, and thirdly epidemiological evidence
apparently confirming the predictions previously derived from animal and in vitro studies.
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27 Paper by Shephard S. E. et al, ‘Mutagenic activity of peptides and the artificial sweetener
aspartame after nitrosation’, Food and Chemical Toxicology, 1993, Vol. 31, pp. 323-329
Shephard and colleagues attempted to simulate in vitro the conditions that can
occur in the human digestive tract, and in particular the conditions that result in
the nitrosation of dietary ingredients. They reported that the nitrosated
aspartame had significant mutagenic action.
Observations
This evidence may be important because it suggests not only a mechanism through
which aspartame could exert a carcinogenic action, but also why the interval between
the compound's introduction and the emergence of evidence indicating increased brain
cancer rates appears to have been so brief.
Olney et al also suggested that aspartame may reasonably be suspected of
responsibility because the other main possible candidates for responsibility, such as
ionising radiation, smoke inhalation, pesticides, electromagnetic fields and various
other chemicals were gradually introduced over recent decades rather than all at once
in the early 1980s. Exposures to those potential hazards are, furthermore,
occupationally linked and it is hard to see how they could explain why males and
females seem to be equally affected.
If Olney’s hypothesis is to be substantiated, it may be helpful to analyse several long-
term brain cancer time-series data sets for other countries covering the period both
before and since aspartame was introduced. That has proved difficult because while
aggregate brain cancer statistics are readily available, information on tumours types is
hard to obtain. If aspartame were to act by modifying an already present or nascent
brain cancer, we should expect its impact to vary in different countries in ways which
depend on the age structure of the consumers of this sweetener and their patterns of
consumption. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a far larger proportion of 50 to 70
year old Americans consume aspartame-sweetened products than is the case in the UK
or in other European countries. According to Sebastian Bizzari et al of the American
Dietetic Association, US residents account for about 75% of all the aspartame
consumed in the world, and therefore the evidence from the USA is likely to be clearer
than from other countries.
(Bizzari et al, ‘Position of the American Dietetic Association: Use of Nutritive and
Nonnutritive Sweeteners’, Journal of the American Dietetic Association, Vol 104 No
2, Feb. 2004, p. 263; available at
http://www.webdietitians.org/Print/8474_adap0598.cfm)
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28 Paper by Soffritti and his colleagues in the European Journal of Oncology: July 2005
In July 2005 Soffritti et al reported evidence that aspartame induced lymphomas and
leukaemias in rats, in a consistent dose-related manner.
Observations
This study is crucial because, for many years, critics of the original Searle studies have
argued that the original studies that were flawed had never been repeated. The study
conducted by Soffritti and his colleagues at the Fondazione Ramazzini, was initiated
precisely because the pivotal studies on aspartame toxicity had been so poorly
conducted in the first place, and incompetently evaluated. It therefore serves to fill a
crucial gap in our scientific knowledge about the toxicity of aspartame. The
Ramazzini study used a larger sample of laboratory rodents than the sum of the sizes
of the samples of rodents used in all the previous chronic toxicity long-term feeding
studies. In these new circumstances, it is now appropriate to conclude that sufficient
information has now emerged to indicate that we can now be confident that aspartame
is not acceptably safe.
While there were quite possibly some shortcomings in the studies conducted by the
Fondazione Ramazzini they were far less serious than those that characterized the
initial studies conducted by Searle and Hazleton laboratories in the 1970s. To
continue to treat the Searle as Hazleton data as reliable but the Fondazione Ramazzini
data as unreliable is profoundly unscientific.
29 Press Release from the European Food Safety Authority: 14 July 2005
This EFSA press release is in response to the publication of the study by Soffritti et al (item
27). The document includes the statement: “EFSA has already held initial discussions with
the scientists concerned and will ask its Scientific Panel on Food Additives, Flavourings,
Processing Aids and Materials in Contact with Food (AFC), as a matter of high priority, to
review these results, in the context of the previous extensive safety data available on
aspartame.” (emphasis added).
Observations
The phrase emboldened for emphasis in this quotation suggests that the approach
being taken by EFSA and by the Scientific Panel on Food Additives, Flavourings,
Processing Aids and Materials in Contact with Food is predicated on the assumption
that the results of the Soffritti study can and should be juxtaposed to ‘previous safety
data’. The analysis implied by this commentary and the dossier of documents that it
accompanies is that the previous data do not reliably indicate safety, and therefore that
those previous data do not provide an appropriate counter-weight to the findings of the
study by Soffritti et al.
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30 Press Release from the Food Standards Agency: 14 July 2005
This FSA press release also responded to the publication of the study by
Soffritti et al.
Observations
This too is predicated on the assumption that the data from previous studies can be
treated as reliable, while the analysis implied by this commentary and the dossier of
documents that it accompanies is that such an assumption is problematic and
misleading.
